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An empirical analysis of political tolerance in Taiwan

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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN TAIWAN

by

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

To My Parents

and

Friends in Austin: Past and present

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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN TAIWAN

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This research investigates how public officials on Taiwan "put up with" political minority groups. Will people support the civil liberties of a political minority group they dislike because of that group's view? The study assesses the level and intensity of tolerance of political minority groups' civil rights and liberties, and tries to examine the sources of tolerance.

This study begins with investigating the overall context of Taiwanese politics as a background for examining the degree to which the respondents in the survey support the civil liberties of their least-liked political minority group. This presupposes the identification of a target group which these respondents dislike. I also suppose that the selection of a target group in part determined by the existence of social cleavages in Taiwan. Then, a latent variable model is specified and estimated to test the assumed structural relations of social, psychological, political, and media-related variables with political tolerance. If the hypothesized model fits Taiwan's data in general, I am

interested in whether the same model can be fitted in three independent groups of subjects (i.e., the Executive Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial Government, and County Governments). Moreover, if the same model is fitted in three independent groups of subjects, would there be quantitative differences among the groups in the various parameters of the model? 828 public officials in three levels of government on Taiwan responded to the survey.

Results show that overall level of tolerance is not especially low, in comparison with the U.S. and Israel cases. Ethnicity is the most important social cleavage that form a basis for target group selection. Statistical results shows that ethnicity (a social variable), individual modernity (a psychological variable), and perceived threat (a political variable) have direct impact on tolerance. Statistical results further indicate that there are significant differences in the model across three levels of government; and there are substantial quantitative differences among three groups in the various parameters of the model.

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Chapter One : Introduction and Literature Review

Purpose of the Study

A variety of social, economic, and political transformations over the last three decades in Taiwan has affected both the growth of domestic social forces and the ruling party's (Kuomintang, or KMT) calculations and responses. Under the control of the KMT regime, "social and economic conditions are maturing; social pluralism is gradually emerging; diplomatic isolation is plummeting; and public mobilization and pressure from below" (Tien 1989:2) have demanded major political reforms and more participation in the decision-making process and a say in the nation's destiny. In response to such changes, a series of democratic reforms and political liberalizations occurred starting in 1986, when opposition parties were finally formed and martial law was lifted. KMT authorities also reformed outdated national representative institutions, though on a limited scale, and liberalized the publication of newspapers (Tien 1989:preface). By the spring of 1988, Taiwan's political system had begun the transition toward representative democracy, and "a one-party authoritarian dictatorship had given way to a one-party dominant system with the establishment of about a dozen new political parties" (Tien 1989:preface), along with several "political minority groups" in reference to their position vis-a-vis the KMT majority. These political minority groups have serious disputes with the KMT about the issue of Taiwan independence. Those groups that espouse Taiwan independence inevitably work against the KMT's ideology of one China policy and thus pose a threat to the KMT's regime and its national identity. The way the KMT responds to such a challenge will

affect the exercise of rights and liberties of these minority groups. Since the transition to full democracy is still under way and seems incomplete and uncertain, the immediate prospects are difficult to gauge. Sutter (1988:52) once claimed that

> "Mechanisms remain for a coalition of party and military conservatives, elderly legislators, and some economic technocrats to reverse the democratic reforms in the event of violence, a succession crisis, or growing calls for Taiwan independence".

Indeed,

> "the reluctance of one-party systems to legitimate the rights of organized political opposition and to share power with them is only one sign of the general intolerance toward dissenters, critics, or political rivals which one can readily discern from even a cursory reading of political history" (McClosky and Brill 1983:8),

and, "systems of official intolerance will very likely persist, in large measure because of the vested interests--in power, status, and psychological security--of ruling elites" (Willhoite 1977:682). To defend the civil liberties of dissenters entails a more difficult and more complex decision process than is involved in suppressing them (McClosky and Brill 1983:18-9). That is the reason why McClosky and Brill (1983:19) claim that "tolerance often is more costly (in terms of its psychological price) than intolerance". McClosky and Brill therefore argue that support for tolerance or civil liberties requires social learning and an ability to understand the rules of the democratic game (p.15). Stouffer (1955) agrees with this point and argues that "the notion of tolerance arises through exposure to social and cultural diversity that encourages an appreciation of the importance of civil liberties for democracy" (Williams et al.,1976:394). Tolerance in this sense is understood as valuable because it helps to maintain a stable democratic regime (Sullivan et al.,1979:781). Lipset and Raab (1970)

view tolerant norms as instruments of progress, "since tolerance allow[s] social groups room to grow and to express their interests socially and politically, and therefore provide[s] momentum for further change in both spheres" (Sullivan et al.,1982:177-78). Dahl once argued that political tolerance, along with authority, trust, effectiveness, and cooperation are all critical components of a belief system that can sustain democratic, or polyarchic, rule (1971:124-188). However, Sullivan et al. (1982:52) claim that "it need not be assumed that tolerance is a fundamental principle of democracy that most citizens must endorse before a regime qualifies as democratic." If one were to do so, one would subordinate the role of democratic institutions to public attitudes. Whether the study of political tolerance, especially tolerance of dissent, is related to the success of a transition to democracy is an important subject worth exploring. Nevertheless, this study focuses almost entirely on public beliefs about tolerance, in particular at the initial stage of trasitional period in Taiwan. Political tolerance here is simply defined as the willingness to "put up with" political ideas or groups that one finds objectionable (Sullivan et al.,1982). There is a study (Tien 1987) that addresses the subject of tolerance and communication studies in Taiwan--but it does not use nationwide data on attitude tolerance among people on Taiwan. Yet the results of this study can promote intersubjective agreement on how to understand tolerance (Sullivan et al.,1982). Moreover, researchers can use the methodology and data to design subsequent studies to focus on issues of political tolerance in developing countries.

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how people on Taiwan "put up with" political minority groups. Will people support the civil liberties of a political group they dislike because of that group's views ? The study assesses the level and

intensity of tolerance of political minority groups' civil rights and liberties, and tries to examine the sources of tolerance.

The expansion of higher education, along with the society's rapid economic growth, have created a new middle class. Since the respondents in this study (public officials working in the KMT state) come from this social stratum, I expect that they would hold tolerant attitudes toward political minority groups and/or their views. On the other hand, political opposition exists either to challenge the KMT's constitutional structure or to attack and attempt to influence policy directions. Thus employees working in the government (which was and has been more or less submissive to the KMT) might feel intolerant of those groups or ideas. Moreover, competitive party systems and democratic traditions are so young in Taiwan as not to afford substantial protection to civil and political liberties. This would lead to the prediction that the respondents' overall level of political tolerance might be low. Whether empirical findings will support the former or the latter remains to be seen.

Review of the Literature

Only one book and two articles systematically compare political tolerance across three countries: the United States, Israel and New Zealand (Shamir and Sullivan 1983; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Roberts 1984, 1985). Using a content-controlled strategy that allows each respondent to identify his least-liked group (target group selection), researchers asked a series of questions to measure how far each respondent was willing to allow his target group to participate in the political process (Sullivan et al.,1984:320). The authors suggest that a "most-different-systems" research design

(Przeworski and Teune 1970) be employed so as to provide as much variation as possible across social and political contexts. The expectation was that the data would reveal similar patterns of relationships that could be explained mostly by subsystem and individual level theories (Shamir and Sullivan 1983:913). They found that attitudinal differences among these three countries are very much influenced by political institutions, historical traditions, and current political realities that characterize a particular regime (Sullivan et al.,1985:238). Sullivan et al. also point out that factors such as constitutional structures, institutional safeguards, political elites, the rules of the game, and external threats must be considered "for a complete understanding of the processes underlying political tolerance and intolerance on the individual as well as on the regime level" (Sullivan et al.,1985:237). Non-individual level variables were incorporated for an individual-level statistical analysis. The empirical analyses suggested a strong demographic bases for target group selection pattern, among them, religion in Israel and race in the United States were the most striking. Though New Zealand has few important demographic cleavages, political ideology and partisanship can have a powerful impact on the process of shaping in-group and out-group identifications, and hence, indirectly, target group selection patterns (Sullivan et al.,1985:238-41). Sullivan et al. also found that highly educated individuals tend to choose right-wing groups, while less educated left-wing groups; and that income had a weak effect on the selection of target group in each nation (1985:147-156). In Israel, younger and aged people did not make any difference in the selection of right-wing and left-wing targets, because "the focused intolerance on one target group excluded that possibility" (Sullivan et al. 1985:163-65). The findings indicate that each nation appears to differ in its potential for intolerant actions. In Israel, "attitudinal intolerance

is high, target groups are agreed upon (Sullivan et al. call it 'focused intolerance'), and intense feelings are more commonly on the side of intolerance than of tolerance" (Sullivan et al. 1985:143). In the United States, "attitudinal intolerance is high, and the intensely intolerant group is substantially larger than the intensely tolerant group; however, the targets of intolerance are diffuse and range across the whole ideological spectrum" (hence being named "pluralistic intolerance") (Sullivan et al.,1985:143). Moreover, the U.S. legal system provides many safeguards for minorities and many barriers against mass actions of intolerance that the other two countries do not have. Finally, tolerant political elites have the potential to protect the system from the intolerant masses "because it is in a privileged position vis-a-vis policy making" (Sullivan et al.,1984:320; 1985:112). In New Zealand, "attitudinal intolerance is lower and the target groups are unfocused, but as in the other two countries, people who are intolerant are more intense than those who are tolerant" (Sullivan et al.,1985:143). The result of statistical analysis shows that "the effects of personality on political intolerance are comparable in the three nations as is the lack of direct impact of social factors on political tolerance" (Sullivan et al.,1985:241). "The magnitude and nature of the effects of political variables, however, depend largely on the broader historical and political or institutional context within which they are embedded" (Sullivan et al.,1985:241).

Aside from the contextual factors, the character of the issues under contention is also important (Sullivan et al.,1985:47). Tolerance is more likely when contending parties share a common definition of what is is in dispute; when a compromise is possible and a modus vivendi has been established; and when the philosophies and actions that one party espouse did not pose a real threat to national survival (Sullivan et al.,1985:47-9).

Several recent studies have dealt with American tolerance for dissent and nonconformity. Part of the discussion has revolved around the issue of whether there has been an increase in the level of tolerance since the 1950s. The earliest empirical studies of tolerance conducted during the 1950s (Stouffer 1955; Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964) found high levels of intolerance and a good deal of unwillingness to extend civil liberties to objectionable groups (Sullivan et al.,1979:781). Twenty years later, several of Stouffer's central questions were included on the General Social Survey (Mueller 1988:1). Analyses of these data have generally concluded that there has been a substantial increase in tolerance since 1954 in the American public (Davis 1975; Nunn et al., 1978; McClosky and Brill 1983:434-438). But Sullivan et al.(1979 & 1982) challenge this finding and argue that these increases in political tolerance were "illusory," since previous studies used only leftist groups as points of reference, much like the scales used by Adorno et al.(1950) that only measured authoritarianism of the right and did not bring into play authoritarianism of the left or the center (Sullivan et al.,1982:52). Sullivan et al. argue that tolerance presupposes explicit disapproval of the group or activity in question. This claim has two immediate implications for measurement strategies and tests of theoretical ideas: "first, tolerance measures should ask about groups from both ends of the political spectrum" (the so-called 'content-controlled strategy' discussed above); and second, it is essential "to assess whether the person approves or disapproves of the target group" (Bobo and Licari 1989:290). Accordingly, they listed ten groups, including left and right and extremist groups, for respondents to select their "least-liked group" and then asked several questions about tolerating that group. It was found that tolerance so

measured was lower than that obtained by the direct Stouffer questions (Mueller 1988:2).

Sullivan et al. (1981:92) also point out that previous studies of political tolerance rely heavily on bivariate correlations between tolerance and a number of independent variables, which can be misleading since other important factors influence both variables in question. They argue that "this sort of specification error can affect the magnitude and even the direction of parameter estimates" (Sullivan et al.,1981:92). Therefore, they provide a more fully specified LISREL model for the analysis of the determinants of political tolerance.

The following sections review various social, psychological, political and media variables that several researchers suggest are powerful determinants of political tolerance.

The Social Sources of Political Tolerance

Education and Status. In his early study Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties, Stouffer (1955) argued that increased education evidently influenced tolerance of others' speech rights. He offered an explanation for this finding: "schooling puts a person in touch with people whose ideas and values are different from one's own" (p.127). And this tendency continues after formal schooling is finished through reading and personal contacts (p. 127). Prothro and Grigg (1960) related education to support for the "basic principles of democracy" and found "a substantial relationship, even controlling for income" (Sullivan et al. 1982:116). Jackman (1972) reanalyzed the Stouffer data and found that higher tolerance among

elites was due almost entirely to their higher levels of education. "If it was not elites who were to be thanked for the survival of democracy, then Jackman's findings led some to conclude that it had to be the better educated" (Caspi and Seligson:1983). Moreover, as levels of education increase, tolerance is bound to do so as well. In tests of just this hypothesis, Davis (1975) and Nunn et al. (1978) found that in the United States between the 1950s and 1970, at a time of rapidly rising levels of education, tolerance for communists was shown to have increased markedly. Comparing the studies of OVS (Opinion and Value Survey), CLS (Civil Liberty Survey), and PAB (Political Affiliations and Belief), McClosky and Brill (1983) concluded that the available data clearly confirm that the well educated, the politically informed, and the intellectually minded espouse civil liberties more strongly than the less educated and the uninformed. The educated "embrace the constitutional liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights partly because they have been exposed more frequently to the norms implicit in those guarantees and have had greater opportunity and motivation to learn them" (McClosky and Brill 1983:374). They are also "more likely to belong to a cohort that prizes libertarian values and that rewards its members for promoting them" (McClosky and Brill 1983:374).

However, there are disputes about the education hypothesis. Lawrence (1976) found that when controls for other variables were introduced, the role of education was much weaker than previously had been supposed. M. Jackman (1978) reported even more damaging findings when she demonstrated the lack of any link at all between education and tolerance with respect to racial integration, although her findings were in turn recently been disputed by Margolis and Gague (1981). Sullivan et al. (1981: 104) pointed out that education had a very small indirect impact on political tolerance through

a multivariate analysis. Meanwhile, Erikson et al. (1988:107) argues that Sullivan et al.'s finding "deny that an increase in levels of education will lead to any significant increase in tolerance". Likewise, income, occupational status, and subjective social class all have a weak relationship with tolerance using Sullivan et al.'s measure (1982:125).

Gender. In his analysis, Stouffer (1955) found that women were less tolerant than men, and that this difference held up under controls for education and political interest. He also indicated that men were strongly opposed to Communism on ideological grounds, while women opposed their anti-religious character (p.169). Nunn (1973: 300-310), doing a research on libertarianism, argued that males were significantly more likely to be highly libertarian than females.

Borhek's (1965) theory of tolerance posits that such powerful differences among men and women arise from work-life experience. He argues that diversity of experience outside the home should produce comparably higher levels of tolerance among the working men and women, while housewives should display sharply lower levels of tolerance. In their study of "support for civil liberties by sex," McClosky and Brill (1983) reveal that in mass public studies, males score slightly more libertarian than females, a finding that suggests that, despite the growing equality of men and women, men on the average continue to occupy more of the high-status positions in the society, take more interest in public affairs, hold more positions of public leadership and influence, and, in general, are more involved in the formulation and dissemination of opinions affecting such matters as freedom and control. As is well known, women are still more confined to domestic roles than men and enter the public arena less frequently

than men to engage in debate over the values and norms that govern, or should govern, the nation. McClosky and Brill (1983:384-5) argue that the differences they found between men and women in their orientation toward civil liberties are "a function of their differential opportunities to learn the prevailing social norms and are in no sense specific to gender". Their argument is close to Borhek's (1965) theory of tolerance.

Age. Stouffer (1955) found large cohort differences in the degree of tolerance toward communists, atheists, and socialists (Sullivan et al. 1982:131). The percentage of respondents rated as 'more tolerant' ranged from 47 percent of those aged 21 to 29, down to a 18 percent of those 60 and over (Sullivan et al. 1982:131). Cutler and Kaufman (1975) argued that as citizens became older, they became more generally conservative. McClosky and Brill (1983) indicated that the younger age groups register substantially higher scores on the civil liberties scale than do the older age groups. In every case, as people move from the younger age groups to the older, support for civil liberties declines (p. 390). Nunn et al.(1978) noted that "age differences in tolerance increased between 1954 and 1973, and that age was an important variable, even when controlling for education" (Sullivan et al. 1982:133). They also pointed out that "additional data reveal an extraordinary tendency for young Americans to lead all others in expressing politically tolerant views" (Nunn et al. 1978:93-4). But Sullivan et al.(1982) argue that all of Nunn and his associates' conclusions about increased tolerance among the younger generation are true mainly as they apply to left-wing groups.(the so-called content-biased measure of tolerance). Sullivan et al.(1982:134) found that using their content-controlled measure, the relationship between age and tolerance is reduced considerably once left and right-wing groups are put on an equal

basis. They continued to show that, through multivariate analysis, age has little impact, although the oldest groups are slightly less tolerant than the youngest groups.

Urbanism. Louis Wirth's (1938) famous essay, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," is widely regarded as an early classic statement of the effects of place of residence upon people's attitudes and values. Urbanism, measured in terms of population size, has been found to be directly related to tolerance, or willingness to "put up with" or allow expression of ideas or interests that one rejects, and willingness to treat others according to universalistic criteria that are independent of any particular difference between self and others in values and attitudes (Parsons and Shils: 1951). Urbanites have been found to be more willing than others to extend civil liberties to those who hold deviant religious and political views (Wilson: 1975; Williams et al.: 1976; Smith and Petersen: 1980; McClosky and Brill: 1983) and more willing to support minority candidates for public office (Glenn and Hill: 1977; Fischer: 1971).

These findings are consistent with the theories of Wirth (1938), Stouffer (1955), and Borhek (1965). Wirth proposed that divergent lifestyles produced a "toleration of differences" which, in turn, led to "rationality and the secularization of life" (p. 14). Stouffer linked urban heterogeneity to tolerance as well, noting that compared to rural dwellers, the city dweller "does rub shoulders with more people who have ideas different from his own, and he learns to live and let live" (p. 222). Borhek's theory of incongruent experience argues that increases in size of place should raise a person's likelihood of encountering new ideas and situations and hence expand the alternatives of thought and action of which he is aware; such a variety of experience

reduces the likelihood of "unquestioned commitment to any ideology, group, or set of norms" (p. 93) and in so doing enhances the likelihood of political tolerance.

However, findings supportive of Wirth, Stouffer, and Borhek are open to criticism on at least two grounds. First, many studies have measured tolerance toward only a limited variety of target groups, such as leftist or antireligious groups, and though urbanites may be more tolerant of such groups, it by no means follows that urbanites are more tolerant generally (Sullivan et al.: 1979; Marcus et al.: 1980). In fact, using a broad variety of target groups, Marcus et al. (1980) reported virtually no association between urbanism and tolerance, and they concluded that previous research using highly restrictive samples of target groups had erroneously exaggerated the urbanism-tolerance relationship. Second, previous research has ignored or inadequately dealt with the possibility that the urbanism-tolerance association may be spurious (Wilson: 1985). Gans (1962) has pointed out that when race, social status and lifecycle stage are taken into account, urbanites may be no more tolerant than anyone else. Fischer (1971) controlled for occupational prestige, religion, race and region, and found residual urbanism-tolerance relationship to be markedly reduced. He concluded that if additional controls had been available, the residual urbanism-tolerance relationship would likely have vanished, indicating that urbanism per se has no effect whatsoever on tolerance. Sullivan et al. (1982:141) argued that urbanism is so unimportant as a determinant of political tolerance that he did not includ it in multivariate analysis.

Psychological Sources of Political Tolerance

Previous studies often fail to offer explanations of the relationship between personality and attitudes toward civil liberties issues. As a result, I will focus on several major psychological explanations of political tolerance.

Maslow's Need Hierarchy. Perhaps the most completely developed psychological explanation of tolerance is Knutson (1972), based on Maslow's (1954) need hierarchy (Sullivan et al. 1982:146). Knutson "merges Maslow's need hierarchy with empirical research dealing with dogmatism, authoritarianism, manifest anxiety, intolerance of ambiguity, anomie, alienation, and political efficacy" (Sullivan et al.,1982:147). Her argument is that certain personality types exhibit intolerance. Unfortunately, she "provides no item analysis; has no clear and useful measure of political tolerance, i.e., her contribution is conceptual rather than empirical" (Sullivan et al.:1982:149). In a national survey, Sullivan et al. (1982:149) attempted to measure respondents' positions on the need hierarchy by asking them to select their most important value from a list provided to them. Following Inglehart (1977), Sullivan et al.(1982:150) selected one value that measured each level on the need hierarchy in this way: comfortable life vs. physiological needs; security vs. safety and security needs; affection vs. affiliation and love needs; esteem vs. esteem needs; originality vs. self-actualization. "Using a scoring system of 1 to 5 for the five need levels, there is a correlation of .24 between position on the hierarchy and political tolerance" (Sullivan et al.,1982:150). Sullivan et al. (1982:162) conclude that this personality variable shows stronger relationships than do demographic variables.

Authoritarianism-Dogmatism. One criticism concerning the measurement of authoritarianism is that Adorno's (1950) F scale has an ideological bias. Specifically, "F scale items are appropriate to measure authoritarianism on the political right but not on the left" (Sullivan et al.,1982:153). Any measurement instrument purporting to measure general authoritarianism should either be content free or be balanced to measure left-wing authoritarianism as well. According to Sullivan et al.(1982:153), "one major alternative to the F scale is Rokeach's (1960) work on dogmatism; another is to employ a more indirect measure that taps a central aspect of the authoritarian syndrome". Sullivan et al. thus included three items from Rosenberg's (1956) faith in people scale and two items from Martin and Westie's (1959) threat orientation scale (p.153). In their national survey, Sullivan et al. (1982:155) found that respondents who lack trust in other people are slightly less tolerant than trustful respondents.

Rokeach (1960) has developed a major theoretical formulation to deal with the conceptualization and measurement of dogmatism or rigidity of thought. According to Rokeach, dogmatism should be understood in terms of an individual's cognitive processes. Rokeach makes the important distinction between a belief system and a disbelief system: the former represents all the beliefs a person accepts as true, while the latter is composed of a series of subsystems containing all the beliefs rejected as false. Rokeach claims that "open-minded people will be much less hostile to beliefs different from their own" (Sullivan et al.,1982:154). As disbelief systems can translate into political intolerance, "individual differences in dogmatism would be an important determinant of expressed political tolerance" (Sullivan et al.,1982:155).

In their national survey, Sullivan et al. (1982:155) adopted seven items from the dogmatism scale and discovered that the zero order correlation between dogmatism and

tolerance is -.36, the strongest correlation thus far encountered among the independent variables examined.

Self-Esteem. Convinced that personality can affect political attitudes, Sniderman (1975) concentrated on analyzing the process of how personality characteristics translate into political belief. To explore how personality can influence democratic attitudes, "he utilized McClosky's (1967:51-110) conceptualizations and measuring instrument of self-esteem, and found a positive association between self-esteem and political tolerance" (Wang 1983:35). For McClosky and Sniderman, self-esteem refers to how favorably (or unfavorably) a person evaluates him or her self. Sniderman (1975:64-115) found that

> "those judged to be low in self-esteem tended to feel insure and inadequate, to feel a sense of futility, of guilt and of disaffection, and to feel hostile and suspicious of others; they were tempted to avoid or withdraw from others and they were afflicted therefore by a sense of loneliness and estrangement" (Wang 1983:36).

Sniderman believed that "those devoid of self-esteem were not liable to learn sufficiently good democratic beliefs such as the notion of tolerance" (Wang 1983:36), largely because their negative self-attitudes have impeded the learning of these values (Sniderman 1975:178). Sniderman suggests that "low self-esteem leads to intolerance because it interferes with social learning" (Sullivan et al.,1982:158).

Sniderman "uses three different measures of self-esteem--scales of personal unworthiness, status inferiority, and interpersonal competence--that correlate highly with one another and that produce similar results" (Sullivan et al. 1982:159).

Accordingly, Sullivan et al. (1982·159) selected only the personal unworthiness scale, in the interest of parsimony, as the best measure of self-esteem. Moreover, it seems more directly related to political tolerance (Sullivan et al.,1982:159).

Sullivan et al. (1982:212&219) have generalized personality traits to "psychological insecurity"--more dogmatic, lower on the needs hierarchy and lower in self-esteem, and have found it to have a significant direct impact on political intolerance.

Political Explanations of Tolerance

Most recent efforts have ignored political sources of tolerance, almost as if tolerance were an attitude without any specific political context (Sullivan et al.,1982:162). Here I focuse on individual factors such as political ideology, political participation, perceptions of threat from dissident groups, and support for the general norms of democracy.

Sullivan et al.(1982:179) use a seven-point liberal-conservative scale on (called an "index of ideological self-placement") which respondents were asked to locate themselves . They found a tentative result which showed that "conservatives focus heavily on communists as targets and are highly intolerant of them; and though liberals focus heavily upon radical right groups as targets, they are much more tolerant of these groups than conservatives are of communists or socialists"(p.185). However, through multivariate analysis, ideology (self-placement of liberal, moderate, or conservative) only had a small and statistically insignificant impact (-.10) on political tolerance (p.217).

For more than three decades, research on political tolerance has suggested that individuals show less tolerance toward groups they fear than toward groups they find benign (Green and Waxman 1987:149). Previous studies have demonstrated that intolerance is a function of the degree of threat posed by dissent groups (Stouffer 1955, Sullivan et al. 1982, Gibson and Bingham 1985). Sullivan et al. (1982:186-192) have suggested that believing a group to be dangerous predisposes an individual to react intolerantly. Using the NORC General Social Surveys from 1972 to 1984, Green and Waxman (1987:149) constructed a question wording experiment and found that "a threatening stimulus in fact reduces a respondent's tolerance toward unrelated groups to a considerable degree, although the effect is smaller for more highly educated respondents". Therefore, intolerance arises from perceptions that dissident groups threaten important values or constitute a danger to the constitutional order (Sullivan et al.,1982:186). Sullivan et al.(1981:97;1982:188) measured the threat posed by each respondent's least-liked group by presenting a series of semantic differential adjectives about the group in question. The indicators they selected for measuring the perceived threat are: honest/dishonest; good/bad; safe/dangerous; trustworthy/untrustworthy; and nonviolent/violent. The multivariate analysis showed that perceived threat had the strongest direct impact on political tolerance (Sullivan et al.,1982:217).

Political activism has long been considered as a major source of tolerance. A body of literature has demonstrated greater tolerance among elites, local influentials, opinion leaders, and activists than among the ordinary mass public (Nunn et al.,1978; McClosky and Brill 1983; Gibson and Bingham 1985; Barnum and Sullivan 1989:146). Researchers have argued that citizens would become more tolerant if they were given the opportunity to participate in politics. Stouffer (1955) found that "those

more interested in politics were more tolerant than those who were less interested" (Sullivan et al.,1982:196), while Nunn et al. (1978) found that "organizational membership and activity were strongly related to political tolerance" (Sullivan et al.,1982:196). Sullivan et al. (1982) used two scales to measure political involvement: one was a political participation scale, the other a political information scale. Through multivariate analysis, the result indicated that political involvement had only minimal impact on political tolerance and was not statistically significant (Sullivan et al.,1982:219).

Some of the earliest survey research on political tolerance (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964) found that, while nearly everyone agrees with basic principles of democracy and civil liberties when abstractly formulated, there is widespread disagreement when the principles are "applied" (Gibson 1987:428). General and abstract support for important civil liberties frequently provides little guidance within specific civil liberties disputes, such as Nazis demonstrating in a Jewish community (Gibson 1987:428). Sullivan et al. (1982:202) repeated in their survey two of the questions used by Prothro and Grigg and five used by McClosky. The results were close to those reported in the earlier studies. Using different items, however, Lawrence (1976:93) found considerable consistency between support for general norms and their application to specific circumstances. He concluded that large majorities of the population in fact apply their tolerant general norms consistently on even the hardest issues (Sullivan et al.,1981:98). Through multivariate analysis, Sullivan et al.(1982:217) reported that general norms of democracy have a strong impact on political tolerance, "confirming their suspicion that general norms affect respondents' specific applications of tolerance". But as Gibson (1987:431) pointed out, the norms of

democracy variable is one of the most poorly conceptualized and measured in Sullivan et al.'s research. In addition, they did not report the reliability coefficient alpha of this variable.

Mass Media Use and the Development of Political Tolerance

In many communication studies, media use has been more or less synonymous with exposure to the media. Though the concept of media use has undergone some changes, McLeod and McDonald's (1985) definition is frequently used. It incorporates time spent with media, exposure to particular content, degree of reliance, level of attention to certain content, and motivation for use. Central to Stouffer's interpretation of the origins of tolerance is his idea that exposure to social and cultural diversity encourages an appreciation of the importance of civil liberties for democracy with the result that the population would become more tolerant in the future (Williams et al.,1976:394). Exposure to mass media is one of the indices of exposure to diversity that might bring people into contact with values, beliefs, and lifestyles different from their own, and hence that might promote tolerance. Many media use studies are related directly to political attitudes and behavior, but unfortunately only a few of them deal with political tolerance. Rubin (1978:125-29) argued that a high level of public affairs exposure links positively with more favorable attitudes toward government. Those persons who receive information about the general picture of politics feel more efficacious and are more likely to participate. On the other hand, McLeod and McDonald (1985) noted that television news is charged with inculcating cynical attitudes toward politics and with making citizens less willing to participate in the

political process. Using 1976 national election data, Miller and Reese (1982:227) found that reliance on a medium (newspaper or television) enhances positive associations between exposure to that medium and political efficacy and activity.

A nationwide replication of Stouffer's (1955) study of attitudes toward civil liberties shows that the "exposure to mass media news" variable does not make an independently significant contribution to the explained variance in tolerance (Williams et al.,1976:400). Still, Williams et al. fails to include psychological and political variables in their analysis. Nunn et al. (1978:163-4) found that interest in current events tends to be politically tolerant. Wang (1983), in his study of communication behavior and political tolerance in the American-Iran crisis in 1980-81, found that media exposure was either negatively related to or unrelated to tolerance measures. He also pointed out that "hard news" preference was positively associated with tolerance measures, whereas "soft news" preference was negatively related. Moreover, the contact motives "for news about other countries" was positively related to tolerance measures among the university students, while the escape motives, advertisement reference, vicarious participation, companionship enjoyment, "killing time" were negatively related to political tolerance among some sample groups (Wang 1983). However, all of the above media use studies fail to include social, psychological, and political variables in one multivariate model to explain the variance of tolerance.

Summary of the Literature

Previous international studies suggest that attitudinal tolerance is very much enhanced by an individual nation's constitutional structure, institutional safeguards,

political elites, external threat, historical democratic traditions, and the nature of the issues at stake. Studies done in the United States share some flaws that limit their usefulness in understanding the sources of political tolerance. First, "they rely on content-biased measurement procedures, and thus have led to misleading conclusions" (Sullivan et al.,1982:209). Second, "they focus on one set of independent variables, thus analyzing incomplete and misspecified models" (Sullivan et al.,1982:209). Instead, Sullivan et al.(1982, 1984, 1985) suggested using a LISREL model to include all the social, psychological, and political variables in one multivariate analysis to analyze the determinants of political tolerance. Since the media use variable has not been systemically investigated with respect to political tolerance, I will use it in this study.

Chapter Two: Research Design and Methodology

Based on the review of the literature in Chapter One, this chapter concentrates first on research design, including a framework for the analysis of political tolerance, on the major research hypotheses, and on methodology, including instrumentation, sampling procedures, data collection, and data analysis.

A Framework for the Analysis of Political Tolerance

The first step, which is carried out in Chapter Three, is to examine the overall context of Taiwanese politics as a background for examining the degree to which the respondents in the survey support the civil liberties of their least-liked political minority group. Respondents were asked to identify a target group they dislike and were then asked if they would be willing "to extend to such groups the same rights and liberties afforded to other political groups and citizens" (Sullivan et al. 1985:235). Since tolerance assumes an objection, "in its absence there can be no tolerance or intolerance, only indifference" (Shamir and Sullivan 1983:911). Previous research suggests that the selection of a target group is in part determined by the existence of social cleavages. Hence, the roles of education, age, residence, ethnicity, and income will be examined. Third, once a target group was selected, respondents needed to decide how far to tolerate that group. This section will assess four sets of variables--social, psychological, political, and media-related --in a latent variable analysis to see which

variables have direct effects on the individuals' level of intolerance, as well as try to explain the source of that intolerance.

I argue in Chapters One and Three that competitive party systems and democratic traditions are so recent in Taiwan that they may not afford substantial protection to the civil and political liberties of political minority groups. Public officials, who were often attacked by political minority groups for too much focus on economic development and for overlooking environmental quality, individual rights, freedoms, and desire to participation , may not put up with such political groups. It is thus reasonable to assume that:

Hypothesis 1: The public officials' overall level of political tolerance is low.

With respect to the first hypothesis, the overall level of political tolerance in Taiwan will be assessed and compared with Israel and the U.S. data so that respondents in Taiwan can be characterized as tolerant or intolerant. The comparison is useful, though subjects among these three countries are different (the Taiwan sample is restricted to public officials; the U.S. and Israel data come from national samples). The reason for comparing Israel is that Israeli politics centers around the issue of Arab-Israeli conflict (Sullivan et al. 1985:126) and the target group selection pattern reflects this dimension, which is very similar to Taiwan's ethnicity conflict (i.e., mainlanders vs. Taiwanese) and the issue of independence vs. unification. Unlike the United States, the legal system in Taiwan does not provide institutional arrangements to protect against intolerance. Also, in the U.S. the widely distributed target group selection helps prevent intolerant action (Sullivan et al. 1985:111).

Previous research suggested that highly educated respondents select groups from the extreme right, while the most poorly educated groups select left-wing targets (Sullivan et al. 1982:94). Hence, I predict that

Hypothesis 2: Highly educated public officials tend to select right-wing groups for intolerance; less educated officials select left-wing groups.

In their studies, Sullivan et al. (1982:100) found that younger respondents are 12 percent more likely than the older respondents to select right-wing targets. In an international study, Sullivan et al. (1985:163) found age did not make a difference in target group selection in Israel; but in the U.S. and New Zealand, younger respondents are much closer to a 50-50 split between right wing and left-wing targets. Therefore, I predict that:

Hypothesis 3: Older public officials are inclined to select left-wing groups; younger officials are closer to a 50-50 split.

The racial cleavage in America is like ethnic cleavage to Israel. Using 1978 NORC data, Sullivan et al. (1982:96) found that whites in America are much more likely to select groups on the left as target of intolerance, while blacks focus on the right. In an Israeli study in 1980, Sullivan et al. (1985:160) found that ethnic cleavage was not pronounced in the selection of target group. Following previous research and considering the political situation in Taiwan, I predict that:

Hypothesis 4: Ethnically, Taiwanese officials are most likely to select right-wing groups; mainlanders select left-wing groups.

In an international study, Sullivan et al. (1985:154-56) discovered that income did not make much difference in target group selection in the U.S., New Zealand, and Israel. Whereas 1978 NORC data shows that the low income individuals are more likely than the higher income to select right-wing targets, the reason might be that "a high income, regardless of education, may lead one to be protective of their wealth and fear groups on the left who would redistribute it" (Sullivan et al. 1982:95-96). In Taiwan, the higher income groups tend to live in urban area, while the lower income groups live in rural areas. Hence, I predict that:

Hypothesis 5: Officials living in urban areas tend to choose left-wing groups; rural areas officials choose right-wing groups.

Hypothesis 6: Higher income officials are likely to pick left-wing group; lower income officials pick right-wing groups.

A model variously regard to as a latent variable model (Loehlin 1987) or Covariance Structure model (Long 1983) or LISREL model (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984) can be applied when a construct is measured by multiple indicators. A latent variable model "combines the complementary strengths of the confirmatory factor analytic and the structural equation models by merging them into a single model that simultaneously estimates latent variables from observed variables and estimates the

structural relations among the latent variables" (Long 1983:56). Figure 2.1 is a model for the latent variable analysis in this study.

Specifically, Figure 2.1 specifies that each latent endogenous variable* η_1 (dogmatism) through η_9 (tolerance) is influenced by latent exogenous variables** ξ_1 (education) through ξ_5 (income), as well as by all previous ηs. Circles in Figure 2.1 denote latent variables and squares denote observable variables. Arrows indicate a causal relationship; i.e., that the variable pointing affects the variable being pointed at (Long 1983:22, Loehlin 1987:4). The model is recursive because it does not postulate any two-way causation or feedback causal loops between variables. The general latent variable model is a combination of measurement and structural models.

The measurement model is composed of two sets of equations. The first set specifies the linkages between the latent exogenous variables and their indicators. These equations are as follows:

$$x_1 = \lambda_{11}\xi_1 + \delta_1$$

$$x2 = \lambda 22\xi 2 + \delta 2$$

$$x_3 = \lambda_{33}\xi_3 + \delta_3$$

$$x4 = \lambda 44\xi 4 + \delta 4$$

$$x_5 = \lambda_{55}\xi_5 + \delta_5$$

---

* An endogenous variable is one whose variation is explained by exogenous or other endogenous variables in the system.

** An exogenous variable is one whose variability is assumed to be determined by causes outside the model. No attempt is made to explain the variability of an exogenous variable or its relations with other exogenous variables (Choi and Becker 1987:287).

Where x_i's are empirical indicators of the exogenous variables $\xi 1$ through $\xi 5$, λ_{ij}'s are the factor loadings of the empirical indicators on their specified latent exogenous variables, and δ_i's are the errors of measurement (or unique factors) in the x_i's on the assumption that the factors do not fully account for the indicators (Carmines 1986:33). Here, λ_{ij}'s being fixed to 1.0 means that it is assumed that these exogenous variables were measured without error; the δ_i's are consequently fixed at zero.

The second set of measurement equations specifies the relationships between the latent endogenous variables and their indicators. In Figure 2.1, these equations are

$$y_1 = \lambda_{11}\eta_1 + \varepsilon_1$$
$$y2 = \lambda 22\eta 2 + \varepsilon 2$$
$$y3 = \lambda 33\eta 3 + \varepsilon 3$$
$$y_4 = \lambda_{44}\eta_4 + \varepsilon_4$$
$$y5 = \lambda 55\eta 5 + \varepsilon 5$$
$$y6 = \lambda 66\eta 6 + \varepsilon 6$$
$$y7 = \lambda 77\eta 7 + \varepsilon 7$$
$$y_8 = \lambda_{88}\eta_8 + \varepsilon_8$$
$$y_9 = \lambda_{99}\eta_9 + \varepsilon_9$$

Where y_i's are empirical indicators of the latent endogenous variables η_i's, λ_{ij}'s are respective factor loadings which indicate "how a change in a common factor affects an observed variable" (Long 1983:13), and ε_i's are the errors of measurement (or unique factors). Here λ_{ij}'s are set equal to the square roots of the alpha reliability coefficients (Sullivan et al. 1982:215; Loehlin 1987:105) and ε_i's are set to 1- α. This, along with



Figure 2.1: A Latent Variable Model

Note: edu = education; age = Age; resid = Residence; ethn = Ethnicity; incom = Income; dog = Dogmatism; esteem = Self-Esteem; value = Value; modty = Individual Modernity; effy = Political Efficacy; media =Mass Media Use; norm = Norms of Democracy; thrt = Perceived Threat; tol = Political Tolerance

(Only 4 y variables shown for illustrative purposes, ζ omitedwhen y not shown. Paths from ξ2–5 to η9 and correlations among ξs also not shown.)

λ_{ij}'s for x being fixed to 1.0 signals that we are mainly interested in estimating the structural relations. The structural component of the covariance structure model in Figure 2.1 is concerned with the causal relationships between the latent exogenous and endogenous variables (represented by γ_{ij}) and among the latent endogenous variables themselves (represented by β_{ij}). There are nine structural equations in Figure 2.1, one for each of the endogenous variables. I shall list three for illustrative purposes here (in scalar form):

$$\eta_1 = \gamma_{11}\xi_1 + \gamma_{12}\xi_2 + \gamma_{13}\xi_3 + \gamma_{14}\xi_4 + \gamma_{15}\xi_5 + \zeta_1$$

$$\eta_4 = \gamma_{41}\xi_1 + \gamma_{42}\xi_2 + \gamma_{43}\xi_3 + \gamma_{44}\xi_4 + \gamma_{45}\xi_5 + \beta_{41}\eta_1 + \beta_{42}\eta_2 + \beta_{43}\eta_3 + \zeta_4$$

$$\eta_9 = \gamma_{91}\xi_1 + \gamma_{92}\xi_2^* + \gamma_{93}\xi_3^* + \gamma_{94}\xi_4^* + \gamma_{95}\xi_5^* + \beta_{91}\eta_1 + \beta_{92}\eta_2 + \beta_{93}\eta_3 + \beta_{94}\eta_4 + \beta_{95}\eta_5 + \beta_{96}\eta_6 + \beta_{97}\eta_7 + \beta_{98}\eta_8 + \zeta_9 \text{ (* not in Figure 2.1)}$$

These structural equations point out that η_1 is causally determined by ξ_1 through ξ_5; η_4 is determined by ξ_1 through ξ_5 and η_1 through η_3; and η_9 is determined by ξ_1 through ξ_5 (only 1 shown) and η_1 through η_8. ζ_i's are included to indicate that the variables in each equation will not fully account for the dependent variable.

Although not shown in the diagram, it is assumed that the ξs may be correlated among themselves.

The following statistical assumptions are required for estimating the parameters of the model:

S_1: Each of the variables is assumed to be measured as a deviation from its mean (Long 1983:20). That is: $E(x) = E(\delta) = 0$, $E(\xi) = 0$, $E(y) = E(\varepsilon) = 0$, $E(\eta) = 0$.

S_2: Within and across each equation, the common factors and unique factors are assumed to be uncorrelated. That is, $E(\eta\varepsilon) = E(\eta\delta) = E(\xi\delta) = E(\xi\varepsilon) = 0$.

S_3: Errors in measurement and errors in equations are uncorrelated across equations, i.e., $E(\delta\varepsilon) = E(\delta\zeta) = E(\varepsilon\zeta) = 0$.

S_4: The observed x's do not load on the latent η's and that the observed y's do not load on the latent ξ's (Carmines 1986:34, Long 1983:22). Thus $E(x_i \eta_i) = E(y_i \xi_i) = 0$.

Moreover, the assumption that "the joint distribution of the observed variables is multivariate normal" (that is, the parameter estimates approach the true parameter values as sample size increases, (Carmines 1986:39)) is required to assess the fit of the model and to test hypotheses about the parameters (Ecob and Cuttance 1987:18-19).

Following previous research, the model in Figure 2.1 assumes that demographic variables (ξi's) (only one shown) may have direct effects on political tolerance (η_9) as well as indirect effects via the other variables in the model. Psychological variables (η_1, η_2, η_3, η_4) are assumed not only to influence political tolerance (η_9) directly, but also indirectly via four intervening variables: media (η_5), political efficacy (η_6), norms of democracy (η_7), and perceived threats (η_8). The media variable is assumed not only to have a direct effect on tolerance, but also to have an indirect effect through political efficacy, norms of democracy, and perceived threats. Political efficacy is presumed to affect tolerance directly and indirectly via norms of democracy and perceived threats. Norms of democracy and perceived threats are assumed to directly affect tolerance only. This model is assumed to be recursive; thus "causal paths among the endogenous variables run in only one direction and no

feedback loop exists" (Carmines 1986:30). Three hypotheses will be tested under such research design:

Hypothesis 7: The direct effects of education, age, ethnicity, residence, and income on political tolerance are weak.

Hypothesis 8: The effects of psychological, media, and political variables on tolerance are significant.

If the hypothesized model fits Taiwan's data in general, we will be interested in whether the same model can be fitted in three independent groups of subjects (i.e., the Executive Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial government, and county government). Thus another assumption is derived:

Hypothesis 9: There will be no significant differences in model structure or parameters among the Executive Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial government, and county governments.

If the same model is fitted in three independent groups of subjects, "would there be quantitative differences among the groups in the various parameters of the model"? (Loehlin 1987:117). Hence, I test

Hypothesis 10: There are no quantitative differences among the three groups in the various parameters of the model.

Methodology

Instrumentation

The questionnaire used in this study was developed from previous studies in communication, psychology, and political science. Nominal and ordinal scales were used to measure demographic factors; Likert-type (interval) scales were employed to measure political, personality, and communication variables. For positively worded response items, the more a respondent agreed, the higher the score he received; for negative response items the reverse is true (i.e., the stronger the reaction, the lower the score). By summing each item score, a total score indicates attitudes as relatively negative or positive. For the perceived threat scale, respondents were asked to rate semantic differential adjectives on a seven-point scale.

Four sets of scales were used to measure the political variables or norms of democracy, political efficacy, political tolerance and perceived threat. A political participation variable was not included because public officials in Taiwan are not allowed to engage in politics according to administrative regulations. Norms of democracy were first measured by two questions from Prothro and Grigg (1960) and five questions from McClosky (1964).

The two Prothro and Grigg questions are:

(1) People in the minority should be free to try to win majority support for their opinions;

(2) Public officials should be chosen by majority vote.

The five McClosky questions are:

(1) No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else;

(2) I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be;

(3) If someone is suspected of treason or other serious crimes, he shouldn't be entitled to be let out on bail;
(4) When the country is in great danger we may have to force people to testify against themselves even if it violates their rights;
(5) Any person who hide behind the laws when he is questioned about his activities doesn't deserve much consideration.

A pretest was conducted during March 1989 at a public official training center in National Chengchi University in Taipei. Two hundred questionnaires were distributed; one hundred and eighty nine responses were returned. The internal consistency reliability of the norms of democracy scale was only .33, which is not sufficient to provide an accurate measurement. I thus decided to adopt the scale developed by Hu (1982) and Liang (1985) as more suitable for the Chinese experience and mode of thinking. There are fifteen items in this scale:

N_1. It is a public official's duty to do his job as best as he can; as to other social, academic, or entertainment activities with which government agency should not interfere.
N_2. Even a man that I am disgusted at ought to have a chance to say what he wants to say.
N_3. In order to promote administrative efficiency, the director of a government agency should have the right to deal directly with public officials that have broken regulations rather than wait for the personnel evaluation process, which might cause delay.
N_4. Though your supervisor may make a mistake, you shouldn't argue with him.
N_5. Members of the ruling party (KMT) have the right and priority to interfere with every aspect of the agency's affairs.
N_6. Public officials should give special services to those persons who have a strong political backing.
N_7. Women are not suitable to be supervisors.

N_8. The director of an agency is like a father in a family: everyone should comply with his decision rather than pose different opinions.

N_9. Government agencies will solve your problems and work for you, so you don't need to petition for anything else.

N_{10}. Letting a subordinate take the initiative in making decisions sometimes works much better than requiring him to go through his supervisor.

N_{11}. For the purpose of faithfully carrying out his duties, a public official should only obey and implement orders from above; he can ignore public opinion.

N_{12}. The legislature has the right to set limits on the power of the executive agency.

N_{13}. It will not hurt the government's dignity even if the courts rule against the government.

N_{14}. Public officials should not take the punishment, penalty and civil responsibilities when they violate citizens' freedom and rights by doing their duties.

N_{15}. Government agencies should not always submit to the legislature, if they feel confident that they are working for the people's welfare; they can fight for their point of view and appeal to public opinion for arbitration.

N_1 to N_3 indicate freedom orientation; N_4 to N_7 equality orientation; N_8 to N_{11} autonomy (participation) orientation; N_{12} to N_{15} checks and balances orientation. Unlike previous research, this scale did not attempt to distinguish general, abstract principles from the specific application of those principles. These questions were presented in the form of five-point agree-disagree scales. N_3 to N_9, N_{11}, and N_{14} are assigned a negative direction. A high score means a high degree of support for norms of democracy. After deleting three poorly correlated items (N_1, N_3, and N_{12}), the internal consistency reliability of this scale became acceptable (.67).

Political efficacy is defined as a belief in one's ability to influence political authorities (or his supervisors) and political process. Verba and Nie (1972:88) found a strong association between efficacy and political participation. The effect of political participation on individual character development is an important theme that has concerned "participation democracy" theorists, who see "an elevated sense of efficacy as a desirable consequence of political activity; a belief that one can and should be self-governing is an important aspect of a meaningful existence" (Pateman 1970:45-6; Erikson et al.,1988:119). Those who hold this belief are people who are frequently exposed to political information and/or who are in a position to learn values and beliefs different from their own. Accordingly, the higher the sense of political efficacy, the greater the likelihood that one will tolerate different political ideas or groups. Taken from Liang (1985:210-11), the political efficacy scale has four items with a five-point agree-disagree score system. Questions 1 and 4 are assigned a negative direction. A high score indicates a high degree of sense of political efficacy. The internal consistency reliability of this scale is reasonable (.55).

The four items are:

(1) Today's society is so complicated that even though I work harder than before, I cannot do anything to improve the current situation.

(2) Public officials like me can sometimes affect the implementation of objectives of the agency.

(3) My opinion is always accepted higher up in my department.

(4) If I request changes to some bad regulations or measures in a proper way in my department, such efforts are in vain.

Following Sullivan et al.'s (1982, 1985) studies, there were two steps taken to measure political tolerance. First, respondents were asked to choose a least-liked group from eight political minority groups (see Table 4.2) from both left and right; second,

they were asked six questions to decide how far they would tolerate that group. These items ask respondents whether they would allow members of their least-liked group to (1) teach in public schools, (2) run for public office, (4) hold public rallies, (5) make speeches; (3) whether the group should be outlawed; and (6) whether the group ought to be allowed to appear on TV. Questions 2, 3, and 6 are assigned a negative direction. With a 1 to 5 score system, a high score signifies one is more tolerant. The coefficient alpha of the six items of the tolerance scale is .86.

A perceived threat scale was constituted by a series of semantic differential adjectives used to describe the least-liked group being selected (Sullivan et al. 1982,1985). They were trustworthy/untrustworthy, good/bad, nonviolent/violent, compromised/uncompromised, safe/dangerous, honest/dishonest. Each respondent was asked to rate the applicability of these adjectives to the group on a seven-point scale. A high score indicates one perceived more threat from one's least-liked group. The coefficient alpha of the six pairs of the threat scale is .93.

Four more sets of scales measured the personality variables including dogmatism, self-esteem, value, and individual modernity. The faith or trust scale used in the pretest was not included in the final study since it showed a low internal consistency reliability (.21).

The following is the faith scale:

(1) Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?
(2) Would you say that most people are more likely to help others or more likely to look out for themselves?
(3) If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.
(4) If a person doesn't look out for himself, nobody else will.
(5) Life is basically a struggle for survival.

Instead, I employed a scale measuring individual modernity, with the expectation that it may be positively correlated with political tolerance. Inkeles (1969:210) argued that the modernity syndrome reflects a strong interest on the part of the individual "to take an active part in civic and community affairs and local politics and to strive energetically to keep up with the news, and within this effort to prefer news of national and international import over items dealing with sports, religion, or purely local affairs". Such individuals have a greater chance to experience values, ideas, and lifestyles different from their own, thereby promoting tolerance. A revised version of the individual modernity scale, originally developed by Yang and Hchu (1974) in Taiwan, was used in this study. Questions 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10 are assigned a negative direction. With a 1 to 5 score system, a high score means a high degree of individual modernity. The internal reliability of coefficient alpha of this scale is .64.

The following is the individual modernity scale:

1. In order to maintain good behavior, long-haired individuals should be supervised by police.
2. A wife has the right to remarry if her husband dies.
3. Sex education should be taught with open discussion in a proper way.
4. Keeping silent in a dispute is the best policy.
5. It is not bad to show one's own knowledge and expertise as the occasion demands.
6. It is not fair to turn your back on one lover and go to another.
7. Concerning festivals, wedding ceremonies, and funerals , we should follow the traditional way and not change.
8. Teaching is such a noble profession that teachers should not ask for more pay.
9. Laws should be enacted to make induced abortion legal.
10. The way of judging whether an idea is correct is not through repetitive discussions among people, but through the judgment of few elites.

Following the Sullivan et al. studies (1982, 1985), I adopted seven items from the dogmatism scale developed by Rokeach (1960). The questions below were presented in the form of five-point agree-disagree scale: 5 represents strongly agree, and 1 stands for strongly disagree. A high score indicates a high degree of dogmatism. The internal consistency reliability of this scale is .71 (after taking out the poor correlated seventh item).

1. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one which is correct.
2. Compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
3. A group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.
4. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.
5. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.
6. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
7. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

Also, eight items on Sniderman's (1975) personal unworthiness scale were used to measure self-esteem. Like dogmatism, this scale uses the same 1 to 5 score system. A high score indicates a low sense of self-esteem. The coefficient alpha was .68 after the third and fourth items were taken out.

The eight items are:

1. I do many things which I regret afterwards.
2. I never try to do more than I can, for fear of failure.
3. A large number of people are guilty of bad sexual conduct.
4. There is no such thing as being "too strict" where conscience and morals

are concerned.

5. I think that in some ways I am really an unworthy person.
6. When I look back on it, I guess I really haven't gotten as much out of life as I had once hoped.
7. People today have forgotten how to feel properly ashamed of themselves.
8. I often have the feeling I have done something wrong or evil.

In addition, an item was included that asks respondents to select the value that is most important to them: a comfortable life; safety; affection; esteem; and originality. Previous research tends to suggest that the higher the position on the value hierarchy, the more the respondents are tolerant (Sullivan et al. 1982:150). Using a scoring system of 1 to 5, with 5 being assigned to originality and 1 to a comfortable life.

Media use was defined as the frequency of use of newspaper and TV, the frequency of use of specific contents of newspaper and TV, and motivation for their uses. The wording for each question was based on McLeod and McDonald (1985), but changed to suit Taiwan's situation. The internal consistency reliability of the total fifteen items was .63.

They are:

1. About how often do you watch TV ?(with a 1 to 5 score system, a high score means highly exposed to TV.)
2. About how often do you read a daily newspaper ?(with a 1 to 5 score system, a high score indicates frequently exposed to newspaper.)
3. When you read a daily newspaper, how often do you read the political news; editorals or columns; economic/financial news; and letters to the editor (with a response scale from never, rarely, sometimes, to always, using a 1 to 4 scoring system. A high score means reading the above four sections regularly).

4. When you watch TV, how often do you watch the national news; news magazine programs; and TV debates (using the system in #3, a high score indicates watching the above three programs frequently).
5. People read informational news in the newspapers and watch TV news or news magazine programs for different reasons. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the statement: (with a 1 to 5 scoring system, 5 means strongly agree, and 1 indicates strongly disagree. A high score signals one is highly motivated to read newspaper and watch TV.)

   5.1 To get recent information about my own area of interest.

   5.2 To get ideas to talk about politics with others.

   5.3 To get information from opposing or matching points of view.

   5.4 To help me make daily life decisions.

   5.5 Has become a habit. (5.5 and 5.6 were originally assigned a negative direction. However, since they tend to correlate with variables 5.1 to 5.4, I decided to convert them into positive direction.)

   5.6 To relax.

In sum, each scale's internal consistency reliability is between .50 and .70, which indicates that they are all moderately reliable measurement scales. In addition, respondents were asked for the following demographic information: sex--male or female; age--age at last birthday; education--six categories ranging from elementary school to postgraduate work; ethnicity--Taiwanese (dummy as 0) or mainlander (1) ; working place--Executive Yuan, Taiwan Provincial government, or county government; grade (general schedule rating)--four categories ranging from GS10-GS14

to GS1-GS2; position--supervisor or nonsupervisor; residence--city or rural; and income--the total family income for the past month.

Sampling Procedures and Data Collection

The subjects of this research were public officials in three levels of government in Taiwan: Executive Yuan, Taiwan Provincial government, and county government. The reason for choosing public officials as subjects is explained in Chapter Three. Briefly, such officials are often attacked by political minority groups or social forces for being too focused on economic development, and for overlooking environmental quality, individual rights, and participation. According to personnel statistics, the number of all public officials is 115,382*. Because of time and money considerations, the sample size was determined as one hundredth of the whole population, i.e., 1150.

Population elements were separated into three nonoverlapping groups called strata (Mendenhall et al.,1971:53). Stratified sampling consists of listing all public officials working in the Executive Yuan together in one homogeneous group, then all Taiwan Provincial government officials, then all county government officials. This sampling assured representation of all ranks. The sample size for each stratum was based on its proportion in the whole population. Accordingly, 400 were drawn from the Executive Yuan, 400 from the Taiwan Provincial government, and 350 from county governments. However, there is heterogeneity in each level of government. The criteria used to decide which groups would be chosen was whether it was an economy or noneconomy related organization. We decided to choose three economy-related

* Data Source: from "Abstract of Personnel Statistics," the Central Personnel Administration, Taipei, 1988:20. Data are based on statistics published in December 1987.

organizations and three noneconomy-related organizations. As a result, six organizations in each level of government served as the samples to be investigated. There are sixteen counties and five municipalities in Taiwan; six counties or municipalities were chosen randomly, and then six organizations in each county or municipality.

A systematic sample was drawn within the organizations at each level of government (excluding the minister, vice-minister, secretary general, deputy secretary general, counselors, heads of commissions and first-ranking section chiefs, since their busy schedules precluded their being interviewed). As a result, the sample underrepresented the officials over GS10 (General Schedule; stands for supergrade) and overrepresented officials at GS9 and under.

The questionnaires were distributed by mail on August 25, 1989, along with the help of alumni and friends to hand out the questionnaires to increase the response rate. The number of returned questionnaires reached 847 by September 30, 1989. A total of 828 questionnaires were used for the data analysis, after taking out nineteen with incomplete responses. Table 2.1 summarized response rates in each level of government.

Table 2.1: Response Rates in Each Level of Government

	# distributed	# response	# rejected	# used
Executive Yuan	400	311(78%)	5	306(77%)
Taiwan Provincial	400	300(75%)	6	294(74%)
County government	350	236(67%)	8	228(65%)
Total	1150	847(74%)	19	828(72%)

Regarding the incomplete responses, those filled in not more than half of the whole 80 items in the questionnaire would be deleted.

Data Analysis

Statistical analyses were performed according to the objectives and hypotheses of the study. Frequency counts, percentages, and means were calculated from the political tolerance scale to test the first hypothesis concerning the level and intensity of political tolerance in Taiwan. The percentage giving extreme responses on each item of each scale in the questionnaire was calculated to estimate the intensity of intolerance. Moreover, the U.S. and Israeli data will be compared with Taiwanese so that respondents in Taiwan can be characterized as tolerant or intolerant. Second, crosstabulation determined whether the target group selected really reflected a major social cleavage. I examined the roles of education, income, ethnicity, and age in the selection of targets. Finally, latent variable analysis was used to test the hypothesis that the relationship between social variables and political tolerance is weak, whereas the relationship of personality, media use and political variables with tolerance is robust. The final analytic task was to estimate a set of parameters for the model to come as close as possible to explaining the observed covariation among measures. The hypothesized model in figure 2.1 (or a variation of it) must provide an acceptable fit to the data before the parameter estimates may be interpreted. There are several ways to assess the model's goodness-of-fit. Chi-square measures and probability levels are provided to assess goodness-of-fit for the models used in this study. In addition, t-tests or hierarchical chi-square tests were used to determine if path coefficients were

significant at the .05 level. Large values of chi-square and small probability values indicated a bad fit to the data, whereas small chi-square values and large probability values indicated a good fit (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984; Loehlin 1987).

Chapter Three analyzes the broad historical, social, and political factors (so-called contextual factors) that may affect the expression of tolerance or intolerance in Taiwan, with the expectation that the macro-institutional contextual approach could be combined with the micro-level individual behavior approach. Chapter Four tests the hypotheses considered in this chapter; and discussion follows the presentation of each set of results.

Chapter Three: Politics in Taiwan

This chapter examines the broad historical, political and regime context in Taiwan and its effect on the expression of tolerance and intolerance. It discusses the history of the rule of the KMT (the ruling party or Kuomintang) government on Taiwan, the problem of its constitutional structure, economic development in Taiwan and and its impact on sociopolitical change, and the emergence of an opposition party and its disputes with the KMT about the Taiwan independence issue. Why has this last issue became salient? What are the attitudes of the PRC (People's Republic of China), the Taiwanese, mainlanders, the press, and especially the political minority groups toward this issue? The issue of independence is related to both national security and national identity. Groups that espouse Taiwan independence will unavoidably pose a threat to the KMT regime. What are the responses of the KMT's conservatives and reformists? Will their responses affect the exercise of rights and liberties of opposition political groups? Will people working in the KMT government support the civil liberties of their disliked political group because of that group's views? This contextual analysis "provides the additional information and understanding of the confluence of actors and events which are necessary to supplement the generalizations derived from the analysis of the survey data" (Sullivan et al.,1985:26).

The Coming of the Mainlanders, 1945

Of Taiwan's population of 20 million, about 11 percent (or more than 2 million) are mainlanders (post-Second World War immigrants since 1945 and their Taiwan-born

offspring). Friction and tension between mainlanders and Taiwanese* developed early. At the end of World War II, people in Taiwan welcomed the chance to be incorporated with Nationalist China rather than seeking independence after fifty years of Japanese colonial rule. At that time, the Taiwanese expected that the reunion with China would give them a great part in running the island (Clough 1978:38) ; they looked forward to participating as full citizens of the Republic of China (Gold 1986:50). The welcome quickly soured as the Taiwanese, used to well-disciplined Japanese soldiers, encountered an ill-equipped and disorderly mob, draped with cooking equipment and often bare-footed, who represented the new regime (Peng 1972:61). Such troops had terrorized the mainland Chinese countryside through which they passed--raping, looting, killing people and animals, and shanghaiing young men as soldiers or porters (Gates 1987:45). Mainland troops ran riot in Taiwan for the next several years. The Nationalist official in charge, Chen Yi, quickly seized all Japanese property, public and private, which the Taiwanese had hoped would revert to them, and considerable Taiwanese private property as well (Gates 1987). Chen Yi was more interested in making a fortune than in restoring the island's war-damaged economy. He and his underlings shipped large stocks of raw materials, factory machinery, Japanese military supplies, sheet metal from public buildings, and the telegraph system to Hong Kong and Shanghai, where they sold them at large personal profit (Gates 1987). They held wealthy Taiwanese for ransom and stole outright from the poor (Kerr 1965:191-93,

* The Taiwanese are the descendants of the immigrants from southern China within the period from the early seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth. For fifty years, from 1895 to 1945, several thousand Japanese came to labor, govern, and do business in Taiwan as part of the Japanese empire.

Gates 1987:45). Under the inefficient, lazy, despotic, and deceptive (Liao 1958) rule of Chen Yi, production was at a standstill and unemployed increased. Moreover, Chen's looting and the use of the bank of Taiwan to issue the island's currency to cover deficit financing for the government and its enterprises created an environment conducive to inflation (Gold 1986:53). The reforms of August 1948 compounded by a sudden rush of capital fleeing the mainland sent prices on the island up 1,145 percent in 1948 (Lin 1973:30). There was no guarantee of the protection of private property (Gold 1986:57).

Instead of moving up into administrative and technical positions vacated by the departing Japanese, Taiwanese saw these positions taken over by mainland officials and their relatives (Clough 1978:38). Further, Chen and his coterie treated the local People's Political Council, elected in 1946, contemptuously; he announced that the new ROC Constitution would not go into effect on Taiwan at the same time as the rest of the nation (Gold 1986:50). In addition, marked differences in dialect and customs between recently arrived mainlanders and the Taiwanese made it difficult for them to communicate. The mainlanders saw no reason to behave better among people who had been part of the hated Japanese empire (Clough 1978). The Taiwanese saw Japanese colonial government as a repressive but efficient rule; however, they could hardly tolerate the rule of the Chen Yi government, which was both repressive and corrupt. Under these circumstances, the rising resentment of the Taiwanese boiled over on February 28, 1947 (known as the 2-28 Incident), when an attack by mainland police upon a native Taiwanese woman who was peddling untaxed cigarettes set off sporadic rioting against mainlanders that soon spread throughout the island (Clough 1978; Kerr 1965) until Nationalist troops were sent to suppress all opposition. The government's violent response to 2-28 uprising eliminated many of the island's political elite (Kerr

1965, Mendel 1970). Anyone whose father, brother, or aunt had been implicated in the events of 2-28 was barred from government work, including schoolteaching, and remained under a dangerous cloud of official suspicion for decades (Gold 1986). Moreover, the 2-28 incident traumatized the Taiwanese to the point that the phrase "politics is dangerous" become a watchword etched into their collective unconscious (Gold 1986:52). The Taiwanese again became leaderless, atomized, quiescent, and apolitical, as they had been after the Japanese military takeover fifty years earlier (Gold 1986:52). Though the uprising left the mainlanders firmly in control (Gates 1987), it also left behind a lasting legacy of hostility and suspicion between these two groups. The beginning of the Formosa Independence Movement (FIM), which was founded by a few active Taiwanese in the uprising who escaped to Hong Kong, can be dated back to the aftermath of the "2-28 Incident ". This movement advocated an independent state of Taiwan governed by Taiwanese and drew on the memory of the uprising to stimulate Taiwanese antipathy to the ruling party, the Kuomintang (Kerr 1965, Mendel 1970, Tien 1975).

Aside from the February repression, the primary source of tension between the two groups was the fact that the minority mainlanders had reserved to themselves the controlling positions in the government, party, and military, except for a few token positions held by Taiwanese who had spent much of their lives on the mainland and had returned to Taiwan with the mainlanders (Clough 1978:45). Of twenty-three county magistrates in Chen-Yi's government, only three were Taiwanese; all the others were mainlanders (Lee 1986:184). In addition, according to the Provincial Government personnel statistics for March 1947, there was no Formosan holding first class rank. Only 9% in the second rank, 9.6% in the third, 18.6% in the fourth, and 33.4% in the

fifth were Formosans (Liao 1958:620). The mainlanders constituted the great majority in the elective bodies* since they were chosen to represent all the provinces of China. By clinging to the recovery of the mainland as the government's first priority, "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek perpetuated the unrepresentative character of the elective institutions on Taiwan which have remained biased against native Taiwanese

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* The national government of the Republic of China (ROC) was established in accordance with a constitution adopted on the mainland in 1946. The constitution provides for a National Assembly to elect the president and vice-president and amend the constitution, a Legislative Yuan to pass laws, an Executive Yuan to carry out the laws, a Judicial Yuan to interpret the constitution and serve as a court of last resort, a Control Yuan to supervise officials, and an Examination Yuan to conduct civil service examinations. Members of the three elective bodies --the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan--were elected on the mainland in 1947 and 1948 from all the provinces of China. All these government bodies moved to Taiwan in 1949. Because "the government of the ROC has never relinquished its claim to be the legitimate government of all China, the constitution and government structure have been retained essentially unchanged" (Clough 1978:35). Throughout the dissertation, we will use the term of "the Nationalist government of China," "the Kuomintang (KMT)," and "the state," interchangeably. It was the role of the party to guide society and the state, a position that followed directly from Sun Yat-sen's formulation of tutelary democracy for China. Therefore, the distinction between party and state became blurred. When it comes to the decision-making process, in most areas, action is initiated by the government department concerned or by the President or the Premier himself, and decisions are made by him in consultation with his principal economic and military officials. Major decisions are then ratified by the Central Standing Committee of the KMT, of which the leader and the chief economic and military officials are members (Clough 1978).

participation and power holding" (Clough 1978). Most mainlanders owned no land or business in Taiwan; accordingly, the only means of livelihood they had was through government jobs (Clough 1978). For the mainlanders, the myth of mainland recovery justified the perpetuation of a national government that represented all China and therefore should not be dominated and staffed by Taiwanese (Clough 1978:39-40). As long as government and military positions remained in mainlander hands, the Taiwanese could be controlled.

Other causes of tension have grown out of differing perceptions of mainlanders and Taiwanese. Corruption in government has created resentment among Taiwanese, as has favoritism toward mainlanders by mainland bureaucrats (Clough 1978:39). Being a mainlander gave one a distinct advantage in getting government jobs, while being Taiwanese often sufficed for being fired from one. Mainlander discrimination kept the Taiwanese confined to agriculture and small business in the 1940's and 1950's, "a situation that perpetuated Taiwanese resentment and sense of separation" (Gates 1987:56).

In mid-1949, the Chinese Communists were on the verge of taking over the regime from the Nationalists and were prepared to crush the Nationalist remnants in the offshore islands and Taiwan. Faced with the external Communist threat and internal subversion, Nationalist China declared martial law for Taiwan and the offshore islands. The fear of subversion led the Nationalists to suspend the constitutional guarantees to form a political opposition party, freedom of expression, and alternative sources of information as guaranteed in its 1947 Constitution, and to expand the scope of power of the Taiwan Garrison Command. Under martial law, the military may itself try certain

criminal offenses (Article 8), and the Commander-in-chief is empowered to take any necessary actions in a state of siege:

> Article 11:
>
> (1) He [Commander-in-chief] may stop assembly association, over speech, teaching, newspaper, magazine, picture, notice, poster and other publications, if they are deemed prejudicial to military affairs;
> (2) The aforesaid assembly, association, demonstration and petition may, when necessary, also be dismissed;
> (3) He [Commander-in-chief] may prohibit traders' strike, workers' strike, students' strike or other strikes of the people and force the strikers to return to original states.

Political dissidents on Taiwan did not deny the threat from the People's Republic of China (PRC), but they believed that the KMT exaggerated the threat in order to perpetuate its rule on Taiwan. Taiwanese dissidents saw martial law as aimed at silencing Taiwanese voices in political participation and as protecting the vested interests of the mainlanders from the incursion of the Taiwanese majority (Lin 1987).

On December 9, 1949, the KMT government moved its temporary capital to Taipei, Taiwan. At that time, the American government judged that the Nationalists were finished and that Taiwan would soon fall as well. It ceased additional assistance. The Korea War helped the KMT since President Truman decided to sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to protect the Nationalists from Communist invasion and to draw the line against communism in East Asia. Along with the resumption of economic and military aid from U.S.A. in the mid-1950s, the KMT greatly strengthened its capability to administer the island effectively.

In sum, for the Taiwanese, they got nothing after their first encounter with the Nationalist government but "a feeling of horror, nightmare, animosity, intolerance and sense of separation or even a return to Japanese rule" (Gold 1986). All hopes that that

they would be rid of their inferior status that the Japanese colonial regime had accorded them, and that they would become full citizens of Asia's first republic, went unfulfilled. The mainlanders "brought lawlessness, corruption, plunder, inflation, discrimination, disease, and an environment of general disorder, coupled with economic and political retrogression" (Gold 1986:50). With U.S. aid and martial law to use against the PRC threat and the Taiwanese opposition, "all aspects of life came under mainlander-KMT control" (Gold 1986:50). Under such circumstances, the Taiwanese had no way to express their interests but to wait and see what new ordeal they would have to suffer.

The KMT Consolidates Its Rule on Taiwan

In mid-1950 the U.S. launched a series of steps to protect Free China from Communist China invasion. These steps included the establishment of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in May 1951, the signature of Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, a subsequent congressional resolution authorizing President Eisenhower to send troops to Taiwan in case of attack, and a wholehearted support of the KMT's UN seat. With U.S. backing, the KMT regime became increasingly secure. Meanwhile, it started to pursue a new relation with Taiwanese society. This section discusses the major ways the KMT used to consolidate its rule and to improve its relationships with Taiwanese society: first, through land reform to win support from farmers; second, through patron-client relationships to ally with local elites; and third, through party reform from above to have close links with and also control of Taiwanese society.

The great majority of Taiwanese in 1950 were peasants. Therefore an important step in building a base was land reform. Taking advantage of the absence of connections between landlords and government officials that had prevented land reform on the mainland, the government redistributed agricultural land, thereby weakening the local political power of landlords and making large numbers of farmers beholden to the new government for title to their land and improvement in their economic position (Clough 1978:34, Ho 1978:168). The KMT's original objective was conservative--"to prevent peasant upheaval rather than to be charitable to the rural folk" (Gold 1986:65). The landlords did not fight against the KMT, for the nightmare of the 1947 "2-28 Incident" was still fresh on their minds; moreover, they were unarmed and disorganized. In the countryside, the government organized peasants and rural residents into three hundred and forty KMT-controlled farmers' associations, to offer credit, introduce technology, supply inputs, and serve as marketing cooperatives (Yang 1970:407-11). Meanwhile, through a rice/fertilizer barter system, the government controlled the supply of chemical fertilizer which was provided to peasants in exchange for rice at below-market prices, an arrangement that was very disadvantageous to the peasants (Ho 1978:180-185). Consequently, the state controlled peasants politically by the farmers' association (through implementing policies and collecting information) and economically by the rice-fertilizer barter (Gold 1986:67). The reform had other important long-term consequences as well. By keeping landholdings small, the policy meant that many farm children would have to leave the land and go into other occupations, thus creating a pool of cheap labor for industry when it began to expand (Gates 1987:51). This cheap labor remained cheap because the state limited workers' power to organize in their own interests (Gates 1987:51 & 62).

Having had no relation at all with Taiwanese society before 1945, the KMT constructed an election system to show that its governing was supported by the local elites in terms of a continuation of legitimacy (Wu 1987:196-97). Moreover, the institution of elections could be used as a political symbol to distinguish between "Free China" and "Communist China" in the 1950s (Wang 1989:83). Before 1969 the level of the election was restricted to the Provincial Assembly, county and municipal assemblies and governments; by contrast, national level elections had been suspended until the regime returned to the mainland. It is because of this suspension that local elections in Taiwan could not challenge the legitimacy of the KMT regime. As to local level factions (local elites), they found that they could not further economic and/or political aggrandizement without joining in and cooperation with the KMT (Lerman 1977:1413). The Nationalist government, "through its exclusive right to organize, its monopoly of patronage and media, its restriction of choice through intimidation or bribery of potential nonparty candidates, and its control of large blocks of military and other government-affiliated votes" (Winckler 1981a:52), could exert a great influence on the outcome of elections. By means of vote buying, personal and agnatic and affinal kinship relationships, local elites as mediators mobilized the public and aggregated the vote for the KMT during elections. The KMT in turn dispensed some patronage like status (non-material interest) and economic privileges in local areas for local elites (Lin 1988:136-37).

In addition, the KMT employed a divide-and-rule strategy (Winckler 1981a:54) to oppress the force of local factions. The KMT exerted at least three nomination strategies to control the growth of local factions: first, to ensure that two viable factions remain competed in each election district, i.e., to nominate candidates from existing

factions by turns; second, to impose candidates from outside to check the existing factions; and third, to raise the alternation rates of the participating elites so that individual force could not grow (Wu 1987:301-334). Under this patron-client relationship (Scott 1972:91-113), the rule of the KMT not only helped strengthen the existing political, social and economic inequality, but also weakened the aggregate pressure of opposition forces (Rouquie 1978:19-35). If local politics in Taiwan are today divisive and lack consensus (Lerman 1977:1418), Winckler (1981b:24) argues that "this is largely the result of the manipulated forms of participation that the Nationalist government has institutionalized". Using Schattschneider's (1960) term, there is a situation of "mobilization of bias" against the Taiwanese society.

In addition to winning support from farmers and local elites, the KMT reformed itself through recruiting Taiwanese in large numbers into the KMT party organization to improve its relation with Taiwanese society. By way of implementing the "Reform Program of the KMT" in August 1950, the KMT admitted past errors and moved to purge bad elements, recruit new members, and strengthen discipline and indoctrination to reinvigorate the party (Gold 1986:59). Under this Reform Program, one of the major functions of the KMT was to provide a link between the leadership and the people. Professional party workers worked closely with and had significant influence on leaders of farmers' associations, fishermen's associations, labor unions, cooperatives, and women's organizations (Clough 1978:51). Through the operations of the party organization, the China Youth Corps, and four hundred service centers, the KMT provided assistance to people ranging from free medical care, job procurement, recreational and educational programs to social investigation of local affairs. Moreover, through party cells on college campuses, the KMT "kept close contact with student

opinion and activities" (Clough 1978:51). Consequently, the KMT touched the lives of people in many ways. As Clough (1978:51) claims that

> "the leadership relied on the party's intricate network of connections with mass organizations throughout the country as an important means of indoctrinating and influencing people and winning sufficient support to enable them to go on governing effectively".

On Taiwan the party-state retained features of the Leninist model as far as the KMT's relations with the state and society are concerned. Tien (1989:250-51) summarized the situation succinctly:

> "The ruling KMT maintains a position of primacy in government as well as in social control. It has penetrated the government apparatus, the legislatures, and the armed forces, and it dominates the mass media and group activities by manipulating rules, appointing personnel, and allocating resources. It has established a network of party organizations that permeate society and may be second to none in the noncommunist world in its horizontal and vertical penetration. Under the circumstances civil liberties are restricted and the sociopolitical life of the citizens is constrained. But the KMT party-state's effective governing has brought four decades of political stability--valued both in their own right and as a necessary precondition for Taiwan's successful economic development".

This situation changed, however, as the KMT led and guided the economic development that transformed Taiwan's economic and social structure. In turn, social changes have transformed the state.

Economic Development and Sociopolitical Change

The record of Taiwan's economic success has been exhaustively described elsewhere (Ho 1978; Galenson 1979; Kuo et al., 1981). This section does not intend to

offer a new interpretive theory, but rather to show the impact of economic modernization on Taiwan's political development.

Most studies describe Taiwan's economic development in three phases. The first, commencing roughly in the early 1950s, was the implementation of three major economic policies: land reform, price stabilization, and import substitution behind a protectionist tariff policy (Tien 1989:19). By 1953 land reform, which involved both the redistribution of farmland and rent reduction, was largely complete. Monetary stabilization measures--"including a thorough monetary reform, preferential interest rates on deposits, tight control of the money supply, and strict government budgets"--were improved to slow the spiraling inflation (Kuo 1983:286-90). To promote import substitution, the government relied on "a multifaceted package of import restrictions, multiple exchange rates, price controls, duties, and export disincentives" (Gold 1986:75). Partly because of these protectionist measures, Taiwan's industries--textiles, plastics, artificial fiber, glass, cement, fertilizer, and plywood--registered impressive growth (Tien 1989:19). By 1956 inflation had been brought under control. These achievements were made possible mainly by U.S. assistance and the import-substituting industries instituted by the government (Haggard and Cheng 1987:86-88; Gold 1986:71-73). However, it soon became evident that the substitution of light consumer goods had exhausted its potential. The import substitution strategy had to be replaced by export-led growth.

Between 1956 and 1958, with encouragement from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) mission in Taiwan, government economic planners decided to follow a policy of export expansion. Over the next five years numerous institutional reforms and programs were offered to stimulate exports and

industrialization (Tien 1989:20). One of them was a Nineteen-Point Program of Economic and Financial Reform that liberalized controls on trade and industry, promoted exports, and created a business climate to stimulate private local and foreign investment. The Third Four-Year Economic Plan (1961-64) incorporated the Nineteen Points as well as the 1960 Statute for Encouragement of Investment, which offered incentives to stimulate private investment (Gold 1986:77-78). In 1966 the KMT established the first Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in which the manufacturing firms were granted all the privileges and tax incentives given to other export producers in Taiwan, but without the red tape (Ho 1978:197). All these export-directed efforts contributed to an uninterrupted economic boom from 1962 to 1971 (Tien 1989:20). As a result , from 1965 to 1972 per capita income more than doubled (Tien 1989:20). But the significance of the export-processing zones declined, and by the early 1970s the government had to adjust the structure of the economy to retain export competitiveness (Tien 1989:20). As early as the mid-1960s, the government tried to strengthen capital and technology-intensive sectors in the intermediate-goods industries to help fit the inland's economy into the world trade system (Gregor and Chang 1983:47).

In 1973 Taiwan's economic development policy entered a third phase with a growing emphasis on high-tech and capital-oriented industrial development (Tien 1989:21). At that time "the jump in oil prices, the subsequent recession in world-wide markets, plus labor shortage and doubling wages between 1976 and 1980, hit Taiwan hard" (Gold 1986). Seeking to cope with the imported inflation, the KMT government adopted a series of measures. It raised deposit interest rates an average of 33.4 percent and loan rates 25.8 percent, oil prices 88.4 percent, and electricity rates 78.7 percent (Kuo 1983:211-14). It also stimulated the economy and sustained economic growth by

going ahead with ambitious infrastructure and industrial modernization schemes called for in the Ten Major Development Projects (Gold 1986:98). By the end of 1978, these projects were nearly completed. Late in 1977, the government established a Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) for renewed vigorous state guidance of the economy. The CEPD soon began "shifting the emphasis in industrial restructuring, stressing technology-intensive, nonpolluting, energy-conserving industries, instead of heavy or capital-intensive ones" (Gold 1986:102). Its Ten-Year Plan for 1980-89 and Four-Year Plan for 1982-86 reflected this priority (Gold 1986:102). To concentrate talent and resources, a Science-Based Industrial Park, modeled on Silicon Valley in northern California, was established in 1980 to attract investment in technologically based industries (Gold 1986:103). In 1987, seventy-three research companies in the park generated sales of about U.S. $700 million, with nearly U.S. $500 million in exports (Johnstone 1988:70). During 1986-1988 the government took measures to liberalize trade by relaxing import and foreign exchange restrictions. Such measures were clearly in response to U.S. pressures to reduce its trade deficit with Taiwan. Taiwan's economy is thus "entering a new phase of challenges in trade as well as in structural and technological transition" (Tien 1989:21-22).

The impact of economic modernization on social differentiation is reflected in changing patterns of employment (Tien 1989:31). Taiwan's occupational structure continued to shift from agriculture to industry. A more open and pluralistic social structure has occurred in the past three decades. According to Wen (1985), agriculture and forestry workers constituted more than half the total force in 1953, but by 1983 they represented only 18.3 percent, and of them over 90 percent were actually part-time farmers. It is clear that as a group, small farmers, without any political power coalition

and with little other bargaining power, lost most of their influence (Sutter 1988:25). By contrast, the percentage of production workers doubled, from over 20 percent in 1953 to over 40 percent in 1983. Other categories, like professionals and technicians, administrators and managers, and supervisors and clerks, saw their percentages more than double during the same period.

Changes in employment patterns have affected the island's social stratification (Tien 1989:31). According to Gates (1981:272-78), Taiwan has five social classes. Upper-class families in Taiwan are of two sorts: elite government and military personnel, often wealthy as well as politically powerful, and big industrial and commercial entrepreneurs, whose wealth is often the basis for political power. In general, the former are ethnically mainlanders and the latter Taiwanese (Gates 1981:274). The mainlander political elite courted the emerging Taiwanese business elite to maintain the system that had brought security and hope to both (Gold 1986:90). Several scholars have argued that class began to supersede ethnic origin as the main cleavage in society (Gates 1981:269, Greenhalgh 1984:536-46). At the bottom are the lower class, the "deviant", and the unemployed. The lower class consists of the great body of industrial workers, landless agricultural workers, salespeople, peddlers, and small-scale craftsmen (Gates 1981:273). Two characteristics of Taiwanese labor have worked against the formation of working-class consciousness: first, workers often used their jobs to accumulate enough capital to start their own enterprise; the other was the high turnover among female laborers (Gold 1986:89).

In between the two elite and two lower classes is the growing middle-class. Gates made a distinction between the "new middle class" and the "traditional middle class"(Gates 1981:274-75). The former refers to salaried employees of large

bureaucratic organizations--government institution, schools, industries, and banks. The latter consists of those involved in owner-operated farms, commerce, and small or medium-sized industry. In the past three decades the middle classes as a group rose from about 20 percent to more than 30 percent of the total population. The emergence of this class is due to a variety of factors, the most important ones being the expansion of higher education and society's rapid economic growth (Lu 1985:1085). As industrialization progressed and the economy internationalized, "businessmen and professionals required more freedom to pursue their careers in and outside the country and to enjoy direct channels to decision makers" (Gold 1986:129). The great majority of KMT electoral candidates and opposition activists come from this social stratum composed of the old and new middle class. Most of them "desire political reforms, but only nonviolently and in ways that will not be detrimental to the maintenance of political stability and economic growth" (Lu 1985:1085). With its rising political and social consciousness, plus its desire for enjoy political participation and a say in the nation's destiny, "the middle class has pushed for KMT reforms, opposition political movements, and a variety of social movements concerned with ecology, consumer rights, civil rights, and trade unionism" (Tien 1989:42). Under such circumstances, "the old division of labor, whereby KMT mainlanders ran national politics and enforced their will while Taiwanese made money in business and channelled their political ambitions into local contests, was breaking down" (Gold 1986:119&130).

Apart from a more pluralistic social structure, an important factor in social change was education. In 1952, Taiwan had only eight universities and colleges; it now has more than one hundred institutions of higher learning. In addition to training a large number of people to fill the middle-class social roles, the universities and colleges have

succeeded in shaping the general values of its graduates (Lu 1985:1085). The students are exposed to the liberal-democratic values to which many western-educated intellectuals are committed. An influx of foreign ideas and practices, along with the rapid development of publishing, modern communication and TV penetration, has given almost every educated person in this society frequent exposure to "American values of consumerism, individuality, human rights, electoral politics, and democracy" (Gold 1986:113). The process of internalizing these values helps support further democratization. Also the modernized infrastructure, nine years of compulsory education (since 1968), and pervasive mass media facilitated the breakdown of rural-urban and geographical disparities, "making for a homogeneous culture and society rare in the Third World" (Gold 1987:306).

Ethnicity

Another social evolution that needs mention was a gradual relaxation of ethnic tensions on the island. Ethnicity has been a salient issue in Taiwan's political arena since 1945, and "the asymmetry of political power between mainlanders and Taiwanese remains a source of ethnic antagonism" (Tien 1989:37). The expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations disproved the former's claim to be the legitimate government for all China, while President Nixon's visit to China and the Shanghai Communique in 1972 showed Taiwan's vulnerability to outside superpowers. Several foreign nations terminated their diplomatic relationships with Taiwan in the following years. Having lost its outside support, the KMT employed a strategy of enforcing its legitimacy from inside to pursue support from Taiwanese society (Wang 1989:90).

President Chiang Ching-Kuo, when serving as premier in the 1970s, began to address the ethnic issue and to start a process of Taiwanization, which refers not only "to appointing more Taiwanese to top party and government posts but also to giving prominence to the children of mainlanders raised on Taiwan" (Gold 1986:114).

Table 3.1: Ethnicity of Taiwan's Political Elite, 1987*

	Total number of positions	Percentage held by Taiwanese	Percentage held by Mainlanders
KMT Central Standing Committee Members	31	45%	55%
KMT central headquarters leaders[a]	11	27	73
Cabinet ministers[b]	30	20	80
Military generals[c]	---	16	84
Legislative Yuan members[d]	348	22	78
Control Yuan members[e]	78	44	56
Taiwan provincial assemblymen	77	97	3
Mayors and county magistrates	21	100	0

*This table is reprinted from Tien (1989:39).

Sources: Wu Ying-ts'un (1987), 76. Percentages for the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan have been recalculated. Figures on military generals are from Chiang Liang-jen (1987), 9.

[a]Secretary-general, deputy secretary-generals, and heads of departments and commissions.

[b]Premiers, vice premiers, ministers, and deputy ministers of ministries and commissions.

[c]Percentages are for 1978-1987; the total number is not available.

[d]Of the 78 Taiwanese, 70 are subject to popular elections for three-year terms; 267 of the 270 mainlanders were elected in the mainland during 1947-1948 and serve for life.

[e]Of the 34 Taiwanese, 25 are elected by Taiwan provincial assemblymen and the councilmen of Taipei and Kaohsiung for six-year terms; 41 of 44 mainlanders serve for life.

That ethnic differences remain salient in Taiwan is apparent in the continuation of disproportional representation in public office and in national identity (Tien

1989::37, 40). According to Table 3.1, mainlanders held at least three-quarters of the key posts at KMT central party headquarters, in the cabinet, and in the legislative Yuan in 1987. Such disproportion is also evident in the ruling Central Standing Committee of the KMT: 55 percent of a total of 31 (i.e., 17 seats) were controlled by the Mainlanders, whereas over 70 percent of KMT party members were reportedly Taiwanese.

Concerning national identity, mainlanders identify more strongly with "China" than with "Taiwan" (Chang and Hsiao 1987:36-39), while Taiwanese identify with Taiwan and its local culture. According to Hu and Yu's (1983:38) survey in Taipei, "mainlanders identify more positively with government authorities, value stability in the existing political system, and pursue higher levels of social harmony and political order". They are also willing, if necessary, to constrain individual freedoms. By contrast, "Taiwanese voters value the protection of civil liberties, freedom of speech, broader political participation, the sharing of political power, and the enhancement of Taiwanese status and influence in society and politics" (Hu and Yu 1983:38). Hu and Yu (1983:37-38) also investigated voting behavior in the 1983 parliamentary election in three districts in Taipei; they found that although KMT candidates drew about an even number of mainlander and Taiwanese votes, opposition candidates drew about 87.6 percent of Taiwanese votes but only 12.4 percent of mainlander votes. Another survey, administered by the ROC Association for Public Opinion Surveys, interviewed 704 college faculty members in eight leading universities in March 1986 in Taiwan. Results showed that "mainlander faculty members expressed fears of the PRC military threat and the Taiwan independence movement three times more than their Taiwanese colleagues" (Chen Hao 1986:16). Today over 1.5 million, or 55 percent, of the

mainlanders in Taiwan were born on the island (Chiu 1983:158), i.e., 93 percent of the total population is Taiwan-born (Tien 1989:41). Perhaps the overwhelming concern about the PRC threat and Taiwan's plummeting diplomatic fortunes have fostered a new, common, island-based identity among the generation under 45 that diminishes ethnic differences (Greenhalgh 1984:536, Gold 1986:119). Moreover, "urbanization, opportunity for upward social mobility for the Taiwanese, and intermarriage have considerably calmed the tension between the two groups" (Lu 1985:1086). Whether people in Taiwan tolerate and advocate a separate status or independence for Taiwan (one of the main claims of the opposition party) is an empirical question that needs investigation. It is this theme that I will deal with in following chapters.

The Emergence of a Political Opposition

The emergence of political opposition "reflected both the legacy of the past and the impact of social change" (Tien 1989:90). There are two kinds of political opposition in Taiwan. The first are two small but legal satellite parties--the Young China Party (YCP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), both formed in China before 1949. These two parties mainly served to validate the ROC's claim that it was not a one-party authoritarian state (Domes 1981:1015, Tien 1989:92). Having got little grass-roots support on Taiwan, and seeing their organization crippled by bitter feuds among competing groups of aging politicians, these parties contributed nothing to the growth of opposition political movements. Generally they have been called "flower vase political parties" because they are only for show (Tien 1989:92). The second category includes the newly formed opposition parties and, before 1986, the so-called *tang-wai*

(nonparty, i.e., non-KMT) movement that emerged in the 1970s. In 1986 most of these nonparty elements joined to organize the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Historically opposition movements with a Taiwanese base have had two general stages of development (Tien 1989:93). Before 1977, the opposition movements can be divided into mainlander and Taiwanese groups. The mainlanders concentrated their activities around the *Free China Journal* , which began publication in 1949 to promote political reform and a genuine constitutional democracy (Wei 1985:344-46). In 1960 this group was dissolved, because the KMT responded harshly to a challenge by this journal's general manager Lei Chen to its one-party dictatorship by clapping him in jail for ten years (Gold 1986:91). None of the journal's editors was Taiwanese. Most contributors were not involved directly in elections. By contrast, a group of Taiwanese politicians tried to win over KMT candidates in electoral contests. As they lacked any coherent party organization needed to challenge KMT power, their gains were often small and insufficient and therefore no nationwide opposition could emerge.

In the 1950's some leading opposition figures were drawn into the anti-KMT cause in reaction to the massacre of Taiwanese elite in the "2-28 Incident." (Tien 1989:90). From the mid-1970s, the younger intelligentsia, mostly Taiwanese, has become the primary source of political activists and has also become important in both the literary activities and the electoral politics of the opposition movements (Tien 1989:95). The character of the Tang-Wai (abbreviated as TW) as a predominantly Taiwanese political force in a mainlander-ruled polity has made the issue of Taiwan's relationship to the mainland central to TW politics (Chou and Nathan 1987:281). Moderates are willing to give up for the moment any open challenge to the KMT's rule and to its one-China ideology; the radicals, with a strong sense of their Taiwanese

heritage, "favor some form of Taiwan independence without KMT rule, and are reluctant to identify with the Chinese mainland" (Chou and Nathan 1987:281). In 1977 political candidates associated with the Taiwanese intelligentsia scored impressive victories by winning twenty-one of the seventy-seven seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and four of the twenty magistrate and mayoral races (Jacobs 1981:27). At the same time, radicals emerged as a strong force in the 1977 "Chung-Li Incident," in which a mass protest against alleged irregularities in vote counting that set off a serious clash between angry voters and the police (Lin and Chang 1978:240-79). The incident indicated a growing popular disenchantment and frustration with the KMT's domination in electoral politics (Tien 1989:96, Gold 1986:3).

The TW have used magazines as their main weapon between election campaigns. Denied permission to organize a party, they established "service offices" to coordinate political activities at local levels. They aimed to "take their message to Taiwan's workers, peasants, and petit bourgeoisie and to broaden their base away from the young urban intellectuals who had started the movement" (Gold 1986:116). The basic platform which the TW proposed during 1978-79 contained the following eight planks (Domes 1981:1017):

1. Total renewal of the membership of the central parliamentary bodies through elections;
2. abolition of martial law and emergency statutes;
3. review of all earlier political trials, and release of most political prisoners;
4. free publication of journals and newspapers;
5. freedom to establish new political parties;
6. freedom of assembly, demonstrations, and political propaganda at all times, and not only during election campaigns;
7. accelerated admission of local Taiwanese to positions of political power in the government ("Taiwanization"); and

8. popular election of the governor of Taiwan province, and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, who are now appointed by the central government.

Once the magazine *Formosa* began publication in August 1979, the TW became bolder and increasingly extended its opposition activism to street protests and mass assemblies (Tien 1989:96). Influenced by the Democracy Movement in the PRC and the Iranian revolution, leaders of the TW misjudged the limits of KMT tolerance and held a mass rally in Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979 that quickly developed into an unexpected riot known as the "Kaohsiung Incident" (Gold 1986:117). The arrest, followed by the trial and sentences, of the leadership cadre of *Formosa* did not stop the opposition movement; "they only slowed the tempo of demands for political liberalization" (Tien 1989:97). The response of the KMT to the growth and increasing militance of the opposition was, until 1985, a mix of selective repression with institutional liberalization (Chou and Nathan 1987:283). The KMT launched a movement that has been called "soft authoritarianism" (Winckler 1984:482) by recruiting more Taiwanese into the KMT, army, and government, and by gradually liberalizing electoral institutions. The reform undertaken in the KMT in June 1986 signaled a fundamental change of course from negative accommodation to the TW to a more positive "democratizing reform" (Chou and Nathan 1987:283). The reform proposal included: (1) conducting a large-scale supplementary election to the central representative organs (the legislative and Control Yuan and the National Assembly) in order to address the problem of superannuation and deaths of members, (2) putting local self-government on a legal basis, rather than on an administrative order, (3) simplifying the national security laws, (4) providing a legal basis for formation of new

civic associations, (5) strengthening public order, and (6) strengthening party work (SPCK 1986:12).

These six reform proposals signified that the KMT wanted to revitalize its inner organization, on the one hand, and to institutionalize and legalize social conflicts so that the opposition forces could be absorbed into the political system, on the other. Many scholars agree that the democratizing reform or transition that happened in 1986 was a result of long term economic development and industrialization that brought about social pluralism which in turn laid the foundation for political pluralism (Tien 1989, Copper and Chen 1984, Winckler 1984). However, Chou and Nathan (1987:283) emphasize the role that President and party Chairman Chiang Ching-Kuo played, since "both the initiative for the reform and the power to implement it over substantial intraparty opposition lay with him". Also a series of internal and foreign shocks occurred in Taiwan during 1985 and 1986 that helped expedite the reform. The first was the assassination of a Chinese-American writer Henry Liu at California by KMT intelligence agents for his book criticizing the personal life of President Chiang Ching-Kuo. The murder of Henry Liu led Stephen J. Solarz, who served as chairman of the House Foreign Affair Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs in U.S. Congress, to urge the State Department suspend arms sales to Taiwan (Lin 1990:9). The second was the bankruptcy of Taipei's Tenth Credit Cooperative, with its mismanagement by officials that tied to KMT politicians, led two cabinet ministers to resign (Chou and Nathan 1987:284).

Wang (1989) explains the transition from a different angle. He argued that the KMT state faced two sorts of legitimacy crisis during the 1980s. One was an investment strike by local capital, and the other were repeated challenges from the

political opposition movement, as well as the new surging social movements. It is these two structural factors that led to the reform. The investment strike indicated that entrepreneurs had a crisis of confidence in the ability of the Nationalist authorities to control the island's fate (Wang 1989:101). The increasing appeal of the TW's street protests and public rallies, plus more than 1500 cases of collective action, including ecological, consumer rights, civil rights, women, student, labor, peasants, and veteran movements during 1983-1987, signalled that civil society no longer feared the state's authority. As a result, Taiwanese society started aggressively to press its interests against the state. Gold (1986:130) described the conflict situation quite clearly:

> "The TW, through magazines,organizations, electoral campaigns, and demonstrations, articulate aspirations of a large segment of the middle class and bourgeoisie despite internecine squabbling. New faces invigorate moribund, tame bodies such as the Legislature Yuan and provincial and local assemblies, raising pointed questions about the dividing line between party and state, the necessity for martial law, prohibition of new political parties, mainlander hegemony, corruption, incompetence, a criminal underworld, lack of social welfare programs, and so on. Literary works express a new Taiwanese consciousness and pride, while also exposing the seamier aspects of society. Taiwanese abroad organize and exert external pressure, often through foreign press releases embarrassing to the government. Young party members demand changes in the KMT's gerontocratic centralist structure. Businessmen, through trade associations and elected officials, press for further liberalization plus mercantilist support in foreign markets. They also demand more freedom to do business, including with the mainland. Returned experts desire an environment similar to that in the West where they resided for years. The state is increasingly becoming an arena for social conflict on the Western pluralist model".

In addition to these economic, personal, and structure explanation, the United States had a significant effect on Taiwan's political development that came largely from the Congress, with the help of several pro-Taiwan-independence groups based in New York. Since 1979, almost all Congressional hearings regarding Taiwan have focused on the island's political development, and include martial law on Taiwan and United

States foreign policy interests (1982), Taiwan agents in America and the death of professor Wen-Chen Chen (1982), the future of Taiwan (1983), political development in Taiwan (1984), and the murder of Henry Liu (1985) (Lin 1990:3). In addition to frequent calls for an end to martial law, more recent demands which related directly to the reform include Senate Concurrent Resolution 121 introduced by Senators Kennedy and Pell in March 1986 to press Taipei to accelerate progress toward a fully democratic system by (1) allowing the formation of genuine opposition political parties; (2) ending censorship and guaranteeing freedom of speech, expression, and assembly; and (3) moving toward full representative government, including the free and fair election of all members of all national legislative bodies, and direct Presidential elections (Lin 1990:11).

Prompted partly by the bold proposal of the KMT, partly by the approach of elections, and furthermore by the fall of Marcos in the Philippines, and the increasing militance of the opposition party in South Korea, the TW activists formally established the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in September 1986. The KMT reacted with tolerance and de facto acquiescence instead of repression. For the KMT, "the recognition of the DPP and the openness of the power to society not only can absorb the social forces and demands into the political system, but also can deepen the regime's legitimacy into society" (Wang 1989:106). Rational calculation by the KMT probably showed that the expected cost of suppression (Dahl 1971:15) would be much higher than that of tolerance.

The Taiwan Independence Issue

The constitution of the DPP gives the party an organizational structure similar to the KMT but stresses democratic processes within the party rather than the Leninist principle of democratic centralism (Tien 1989:100). It not only opposes the PRC's one-party dictatorship, but also proclaims strong opposition to any form of totalitarian dictatorship. The most controversial article is the party's call for self-determination for Taiwan's residents regarding their political future (CP November 7,1986:1). KMT authorities denounced this article for conflicting with the national policy of reunification with the mainland. Kuan Chung, the KMT's chief election strategist, declared that "independence advocacy only stirs up internal hatreds and divisions --[and] invites outside interference" (FEER November 23,1989:38). The Taipei high court sentenced two radicals to eleven and ten years respectively for promoting Taiwan independence in 1988 (MCJP January 17,1988:3). In keeping with its United Front policy, Beijing has welcomed the formation of the new party (CP November 1,1986:1). However, the PRC has reiterated that Taiwan independence would constitute a major reason for Beijing to take military action against Taiwan (Tien 1989:101). About this point, the KMT has always employed the PRC's threatening cues through its controlled media against the DPP during and before the campaign on November and December 1989 to appeal to the Taiwanese that a victory by the DPP would lead to the destruction of well-being on Taiwan. The DPP, in turn, has accused the KMT political elites of their "manipulation of threatening cues in large measure for domestic political advantage as well as to sustain hefty defense budgets" (Sullivan et al.,1985:114 & 145). The United States has not welcomed the pro-independence force in the island, "chiefly because of

the disturbance it would cause in U.S.-PRC relations" (WP December 4,1986:editorial).

DPP politicians argue that self-determination means simply that "the residents of the island should be consulted in any decision concerning its future, rather than having their fate determined by the KMT, PRC, and U.S. without their participation" (Chou and Nathan 1987:295). The KMT's decision to legalize visits to relatives on the mainland since the fall of 1987 has heightened concerns over an ultimate KMT-CCP (Chinese Communist Party) settlement (Tien 1989:101). "Discussing the issue of Taiwan independence has become all the more urgent lest political deals be made secretly between authorities in Beijing and Taipei without public knowledge" (Tien 1989:101). At the special session of the party congress in April 1988, the DPP issued a statement reaffirming Taiwan's independent sovereignty and rejecting the PRC's claim of jurisdiction over Taiwan (TLCP April 18,1988:2). Moreover, China Times in Taipei argued that no one was more effectively fostering Taiwan independence sentiment than the Beijing regime itself, with its brutal treatment of its own citizens during the Tiannanmen Square slaughter in June 1989 (FEER November 23,1989:38). Nevertheless, a majority of DPP moderate leaders remains convinced that "a pro-independence platform would scare off many potential party members and voters, making the DPP strictly a party of Taiwan independence" (Tien 1989:101). They prefer to concentrate their efforts on accelerating further political liberalization and democratic reform. The DPP split on this issue, as its radical New Tide faction openly campaigned to create a new country with a new constitution (i.e., Taiwan independence) in the recent island-wide election on December 2, 1989, arguing that it is the only way native Taiwanese, who represent 85% of the island's twenty million people, can free

themselves from the grip of mainlanders (Time, December 11,1989:20). Meanwhile, the radical New Tide publicly burned five PRC flags to protest Beijing's threat of military actions against Taiwan should Taiwan become an independent country. Twenty of the thirty-two radical New Tide faction candidates won the election, a far higher proportion than either Beijing or the KMT expected (FEER December 14,1989:23). According to a publisher of a liberal magazine, though polls before the election showed that no more than 15% favored independence, and far fewer consider it a top priority, "they [the radical New Tide] wanted to use this precious opportunity of the election to talk about it" (Time, December 11,1989:20). The 1989 election result shows strong support for the DPP: the DPP captured 38% of the popular vote in the city and county executive races versus the KMT's 53%. It is still unknown whether voting for the DPP is based on the DPP's independence ideology or their frustration at the KMT's slow reform process.

Several salient political groups or social forces can be identified which are either tied to the KMT or are not yet included in the DPP. These consist of a group of pro-unification nationalists around Hsia-Ch'ao magazine, which recently established a "China Unification Ally"; a group of radical anti-communist and nationalist circles called the Patriotic League, which exist mainly to counter the DPP's ideology and action and which are inclined to support reunification; a group of pro-independence politicians based in New York called World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), who opened their annual meeting in Taipei on August 21, 1988 and urged Taiwanese to set up a new and independent government; and a group of young ministers, mainly of the Taiwan Presbyterian church , who were educated by western missionaries dedicated to a "theology of revolution" (Domes 1981:1017), and who

once issued "A Declaration on Human Rights" that came close to advocating independence for Taiwan (Jacobs 1981:26) and who are involved in political opposition movements and have often spoken out on democratization and civil rights (Tien 1989:53). Under the new civic associations law, such forces can organize parties or interest groups, they can align with the DPP, or they can remain unorganized (Chou and Nathan 1987:295). Due to their limited members, all of these groups, along with the DPP, DSP (Democratic Socialist Party) and YCP (Young China Party), can be called minority political groups. Their common characteristics are a desire for political participation, power sharing, and a voice in the nation's destiny.

A Contextual Analysis of Political Tolerance

This chapter has thus far traced the rule of the KMT on Taiwan. Since 1945, the KMT has exerted authoritarian rule over the island. Suffering from diplomatic isolation, the then premier Chiang Ching-Kuo began in the mid-1970s a process of Taiwanization to recruit both Taiwanese and mainland elites into the KMT's ruling circle. Economic development and social-political change accompanied such moves. Though the KMT state promoted the economic development, Taiwan has been transformed by the social and political changes which economic development has brought. The emergence of opposition movements and other social forces, which are largely composed of Taiwanese middle and working classes, signalled that the people's wishes would have to be actively considered in future political and economic policy making. Thus the contemporary situation in Taiwan reflects "the legacy of the past and the impact of social change" (Tien 1989). Major breakthroughs in democratic reform and political

liberalization occurred from 1986 to 1988, when opposition parties were finally formed, martial law was lifted, and the KMT reformed outdated national representative institutions (although on a limited scale) and liberalized the publication of newspapers (Tien 1989:preface). The one-party authoritarian regime was replaced by a dominant-party system with the establishment of about a dozen new political parties, plus several minority political groups. "This is rare in the worldwide evolution of Leninist-style political systems, none of which has ever before tolerated the formation of a significant opposition party" (Chou and Nathan 1987:277). Certain major factors contributed to change: "maturing social and economic conditions; emergent social pluralism; political mobilization and pressure from below" (Tien 1989:2); the role of President Chiang; and "pressure from the United States that influences the elite in favor of liberalization and democratic reforms"(Tien 1989:2). The KMT's internal transition and gradual adaptation to change has been a difficult decision, but it is vital.

The DPP is unsatisfied with the timetable and tempo of the reform. It continually challenges the KMT's representative bodies and "wants reform measures to include the possibility that the National Assembly may some day be controlled by a Taiwanese majority that could choose the ROC's President, revise the constitution and tailor it to Taiwan's local identity" (Tien 1989:161). The DPP also poses its objection to the National Security Law, which was enacted by the government as martial law was lifted. Article Two of the National Security Law states that "no person may violate the constitution or advocate communism or the division of the national territory in the exercise of the people's freedoms of assembly and association"--the so called three principles. Any candidate would be persecuted who expressed political views contrary to these three principles. Some analysts believe that "the three principles could be used

to disband the DPP and other opposition party advocating independence or self-determination" (Sutter 1988:50-51). Under the circumstances the current reform agenda and the DPP's future remain uncertain, as "Chiang's efforts at reform and liberalization provoke strong opposition among elderly legislators, conservative mainlanders in the Party Central Committee and military, and some economic technocrats" (Hoon 1988:18-19). "Mechanisms remain for a coalition of these groups to reverse the reforms in the event of violence, a succession crisis, or growing calls for Taiwan independence" (Sutter 1988:52, Chou and Nathan 1987:297). Thus the tension between dissent (free speech) and national security is always present.

KMT's hard-liners (conservatives and military leaders) have little desire to nurture democracy for the DDP or for any other minority groups, and they resist the processes of Taiwanization and democratization (Wang 1989:108). Moreover, "powerful conservative officials want the government to get tough with anyone who openly pushes for independence" (Time, December 11,1989:20). Thus hardliners should exhibit an intolerant attitude toward the DPP and other similar groups. KMT reformists face increased challenges from the society concerning the legitimacy of the political, especially the parliamentary, structure. At the same time, they need to respond to the needs from different segments of civil society for greater participation, a need that will lead unavoidably to greater Taiwanization. Thus, the dilemma is still there: the further the KMT government's policy advances toward democratization and Taiwanization, the more it will inevitably lead to substantive independence that favors the DPP's ideology, and of course the less it will represent their own ideology. KMT leaders have yet to reach a consensus on the scope and direction of political

liberalization and democratic reforms. Accordingly, the reformers' attitude toward political minority groups might range between tolerant and intolerant.

DPP radicals in the short run might continue to serve as a political instrument for Taiwan independence and other protest movements, but "would look increasingly like a mission-oriented revolutionary party with a goal of restructuring the current constitutional order" (Tien 1989:101). Under such circumstances, the KMT might not tolerate it as an opposition party. In contrast, DPP moderates would rather maintain Taiwan's de facto independence than confront the question head on, and favor working within the system to push for further political liberalization and democratic reforms. The judicial system remains the final arbitrator to decide whether the calls for Taiwan independence is within the sphere of freedom of speech or is sedition. The PRC always threatens to take military action against Taiwan should Taiwan claim independence. The U.S. supports Taiwan's democratic movement but shies away from supporting the principle of self-determination because the latter could create new problems in relations with the PRC (WP December 4,1986:A18). But support for democratic movement inevitably favors a separate status for Taiwan.

Political minority groups (including the DPP) consistently and regularly promote their demands for greater political participation in deciding Taiwan's future status, and are therefore either intolerant of any statute that stifles freedom of speech. For the Taiwanese, it appears that the situation under totalitarian rule and the Tiannanmen Square slaughter in the mainland China have scared them, and they therefore have reticent and reluctant attitudes toward reunification. The people of the ROC might not want to forfeit their economic prosperity and political freedom to join the communist mainland (Copper 1987:8). This situation might affect the Taiwanese

attitude toward favoring independence. Though the mainlanders value stability, order, and social harmony, their appreciation and respect of the Taiwanese desire for "the protection of civil liberties, freedom of speech, broader political participation, the sharing of political power, and the enhancement of Taiwanese status and influence in society and politics" (Hu and Yu 1983:83) may not so strong as Taiwanese.

The liberalization of the press since January 1988 has made it possible for the press to cover social protests and opposition politics in broader and deeper ways, thereby resulting in a free flow of information about such demonstration movements, on the one hand, and making it harder for the KMT to manipulate and monopolize news on the other (Chang 1989:39). Nevertheless, "television and radio remain the exclusive domain of the KMT" (Sutter 1988:50), which denied DPP candidates' access to the mass media during the campaign period. But the "media enterprises cater to market demands and commercial needs, the authorities' long-established efforts to sanitize the media for political purpose have met with growing resistance" (Tien 1989:251). Journalists, together with professors and intellectuals, would like to issue public calls for tolerance of and openness to the views of others. For the leaders and followers of the mass movements, the growing disenchantment about the "consciousness of the rights" and "structural inequality" of their positions have helped them to continue to struggle for their rights against the KMT state and entrepreneurs.

Sources of Political Intolerance

Politically, tolerance implies a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes. A tolerant regime is "one that does not restrict, much less

suppress, ideas that challenge its basic principles" (Sullivan et al.,1982:2). But there are many factors which can influence the expression of a tolerant or intolerant attitudes. First are institutional factors such as KMT's parliamentary structural reforms and Taiwanization process. Systems of official intolerance will very likely persist, in large measure because of "the vested interests---in power, status, and psychological security"---of conservative party and military ruling elites (Willhoite 1977:682). Intolerance is most likely to come from the DPP and even from the younger KMT reformists if the process of structural reform remains sluggish. Second are legal factors. The KMT could employ the National Security Law to disband the DPP and other opposition parties advocating independence or self-determination, whereas in response the DPP could launch a campaign through the Legislative Yuan to have the law changed. Also, the judicial arbitration of the "independence issue" is important, since it can serve either as an institutional protection of the rights of the political minority groups or as an instrument working for the KMT's political purpose. The alternative is that the judicial system might set a standard (like the "clear and present danger" principle) for contending parties to follow.

Third, the character of the issues under contention is also of great importance to the expression of tolerance and intolerance (Sullivan et al.,1985:47). The Taiwan independence issue relates to both national security and national identity. Its definition disputed between contending parties and no compromise is possible. As a result, the prospects for intolerance are substantially increased. Fourth are the real or potential threats posed by the political minority groups. National security concern stems from the PRC-ROC confrontation. If the KMT found that there existed "realistic threats to the values and the political and economic well-being of the majority of the people"

(Sullivan et al.,1985:41) and especially a threat to overturn the KMT regime from the DPP, then levels of intolerance would increase substantially. The PRC is intolerant of the DPP's ideology and would use military force against Taiwan should the claim of independence become real. Threat cues, manipulated and reinforced by the KMT through its controlled media, accused the DPP of being used for domestic political advantage and for sustaining large defense budgets. Certainly, threat cues have become one of the determinants of the expression of tolerance or intolerance. Fifth is ethnicity, which is one of the most important social cleavages in Taiwan. The greater the degree to which the KMT is committed to the democratic norms and reform process, the less intolerance there will be between mainlanders and Taiwanese. In addition, the Taiwanese would more favor independence rather than reunification with China. Ethnicity, under such circumstances, constitutes a vital factor for determining tolerance or intolerance.

Sixth are the foreign factors. The U.S. and PRC can influence the cohesion of the KMT. The U.S. Congress, with the help of the overseas pro-Taiwan-independence groups, has pushed the KMT for democratic reform. Stability in East Asia would benefit the U.S., the PRC and the ROC. With assistance from the U.S., the ROC's democratic reform and economic development can continue without fear of being attacked from the PRC. However, the current investment between Taiwanese businessmen and mainlanders have aroused great dispute within the KMT. The PRC is welcomed by Taiwanese investors and offers significant benefits to them. Since KMT conservatives insist on the one China policy, should the current situation keep going, they might not tolerate the reformists' policy. Moreover, the fierce struggle between the KMT conservatives and reformists could be seen in the current Presidential campaign

on March 1990. The conservatives nominated their own Presidential and vice-Presidential candidates against the KMT's official nomination. Hence, there is a possibility, at least implicitly, that the KMT might split into two parties. All of these factors constitute the context that shapes political tolerance in Taiwan.

This chapter has emphasized the broad political, historical, and regime characteristics and their effect on the expression of tolerance. The empirical analysis that follows employs microlevel data to explain attitude tolerance among individuals toward political minority groups. Since the political opposition either push for changes of the constitutional structures (i.e., to challenge the KMT's power structure) or attempt to influence the policy directions, government employees may feel more or less submissive to the KMT and thus intolerant of such groups and their ideas. In Taiwan the Executive Yuan is the administrative arm of the ROC government. Though "the Executive Yuan and its administrative branches (i.e.,Taiwan Provincial government, county and municipal governments) are largely confined to policy proposals, policy programming, and implementing the policies already approved by the Office of the President and the KMT's Central Standing Committee" (Tien 1989:121), they can influence policy decisions by initiating and controlling policy directions and providing the options that they feel comfortable and advantageous. The Executive Yuan and its administrative branches has thus become one of the major objects to be attacked by the political minority groups and social forces.

Various levels of government have guided and implemented economic development. Almond and Powell (1978:381-87) argue that the developmental strategy that the KMT government adopted in Taiwan is an authoritarian-technocratic-mobilization pattern that emphasized national stability, economic growth and equality,

and government efficiency. Economically, Taiwan's achievement in large measure lies in administrative quality and efficiency. Politically, however, the authoritarian rule of the KMT and its government in Taiwan have overlooked people's rights, freedoms, and a desire for participation. The political minority groups that emerged from the civil society during the 1980s in Taiwan signalled that government policy and operation contain some basic flaws and biases.

The next chapter investigates the structure of the respondents' attitudes on tolerance, the target group selection patterns, and finally, the extent to which the characteristics of individuals determine their levels of political tolerance as well as explain that tolerance.

Chapter Four: Results and Discussions

This chapter describes the results of the data analyses germane to the research hypotheses identified in Chapter Two. It includes five sections. I begin with a brief demographic description of the sample surveyed. Second, the overall level of political tolerance in Taiwan will be assessed and compared with Israel and the United States data so that respondents in Taiwan can be characterized as tolerant or intolerant. Third, the thesis that the manner in which the target group is selected does in tact reflect the social cleavages in Taiwan will be examined. The fourth section will investigate four sets of social, psychological, media, and political variables through latent variable analysis to see which variables appear to have a direct effect on individual levels of tolerance. The last section examines if a model of the same structure can be fitted in three groups of subjects (i.e., the Executive Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial Government, and the County Government). If it does, are there quantitative differences among the groups in the various parameters of the model?

Sample Description

Before testing hypotheses, an examination of the sample is useful. Of the 828 respondents in this sample, 66 percent (N = 545) are male, and 34 percent of them (N = 282) are female. A majority of respondents (N = 435, 53%) are less than 40 years old). Taiwanese make up 72 percent (N = 596) of the sample, while mainlanders comprise 28 percent (N = 231). An overwhelming majority of Taiwanese (N = 506,

85.3%) and mainlanders (N = 190, 82.6%) have more than twelve years of education; only 87 Taiwanese (14.7%) and 40 mainlanders (17.4%) have between eight and twelve years. Of the higher income individuals (monthly family income more than 50000 in New Taiwanese dollars), 72 percent (N = 169) are Taiwanese, while only 28 percent (N = 66) are mainlanders. Nearly all of those living in urban areas (94.4%, N = 306) are college educated; however, most of those who live in rural areas (79%, N = 383) still have college educations.

The Overall Level of Political Tolerance

Three criteria were used to test the first hypothesis: first, whether the level of political tolerance is low; second, whether agreement exists among the respondents about what group to repress; and third, how strongly (intensely) respondents feel about constraining or not constraining the rights and freedoms of political minority groups (Sullivan et al.,1985:112-129).

Hypothesis 1: Overall level of political tolerance is low.

Concerning the level of political tolerance, respondents were asked to identify a target group which they dislike (otherwise there can be no tolerance or intolerance, only indifference). Respondents were then asked a series of questions about their least-liked groups (see Table 4.2): whether it ought to be allowed to run candidates for public offices or for the legislature; whether its members ought to be allowed to teach in public schools; whether it ought to be outlawed; whether it should be allowed to hold public

rallies; whether its members should be allowed to give speeches; and whether members of that group ought to appear on TV. The more the respondents support the civil liberties of their least-liked group, the more they present tolerant responses, and vice versa. Data presented in Table 4.1 indicate that the average level of political tolerance is not especially low (.31), compared with the Israeli (.33) and the American (.38) cases.

Table 4.1 : Political Tolerance in Three Nations

	Percent Tolerant (%T) and Intolerant (%InT)						
	Taiwan			U.S.*		Israel*	
	%T**	%InT	N**	%T	N	%T	N
Run for public office	30%	39%	199	19%	287	13%	119
Teach	19	56	128	21	317	27	247
Outlawed	36	31	240	31	468	31	283
Rallies	24	52	156	37	558	36	329
Speech	37	36	242	55	830	38	347
Appear on TV	39	32	256				
(Phones Tapped)				65	981	53	484
Average	31%	41%	204	38%	573	33%	301

* The U.S. and Israeli data came from Sullivan et al. (1985:116). Both data are national samples. Since missing cases are unavailable, I suppose no missing cases in the U.S. and Israeli data. Missing cases in Taiwan have been taken out.

** %T means percentage of tolerant responses, %InT is percentage of intolerant response, N is the number of tolerant responses. Data are based on five response scale 1 thru 5. Tolerant responses include answers 4 and 5 on a five-point scale; intolerant response are 1 and 2.

The items on which the Taiwanese were more tolerant than the other two countries were whether to permit a least-liked group member to run for public office and whether this group should be outlawed. In Israel and the U.S., the respondents

were asked whether members of their least-liked group should be able to run for the nation's highest political office (president or prime minister). Since this office is symbolically important, it may not be surprising that the respondents registered an intolerant score on this item. In contrast, Taiwanese respondents were asked if a least-liked member should be able to run for "general public office". In Taiwan, elections are familiar to adults. They happen every three years for members of the Legislative Yuan (for supplementary election only), every four years for the Provincial Assemblymen, county-level executives, subcounty executives, and city and county councilmen, and every six years for members of the National Assembly. Each time non-KMT candidates have been actively involved in these elections; non-KMT candidates generally took about a third of the popular vote between 1972 and 1989. Thus respondents in Taiwan might be accustomed to this phenomenon, and would be willing to give more tolerant response to their least-liked group. Chi-square test ($\chi^2 = 70.3$, 2 df, $p < .05$) shows that there are significant differences among these three countries about this item.

Taiwanese respondents seemed to reject the suggestion that their most disliked group be outlawed: they registered 36% tolerance score vs. 31% intolerant response according to Table 4.1. One possible explanation is that the ROC government promulgated a Public Officials Election and Recall Law in May 1980, which provides the non-KMT organization with a formal legal foundation to participate in electoral politics (Gregor and Chang 1983:73). Furthermore, a newly created Civic Organization Law now legally permits the formation of opposition parties. Since the respondents are themselves public officials, they may realize that a group can not be outlawed without proper reasons. Statistical tests ($\chi^2 = 6.18$, 2 df, $p < .05$) indicate that there are significant differences among these three countries.

The least tolerant item in Table 4.1 was whether to allow a least-liked group to teach in a public school. This item only scored 19%. Comparing with Israel (27%) and the U.S. (21%), Taiwan was the least tolerant. In addition, the intolerant response of this item (56%) was three times greater than the tolerant score (19%). The reason might be that public national universities and public high schools tend to have higher prestige than do private universities and high schools (the reverse of the American educational system). Parents are proud of their sons and daughters being able to enter public schools. As a result, teachers' qualifications are of deep concern to parents. Moreover, "the fear that the attitudes of children will be influenced by a member of the least-liked political group" is an important consideration (Sullivan et al. 1985:118). A Chi-square test ($\chi^2 = 16.9$, 2df, $p < .05$) shows that there are significant differences among the three countries about this item.

The second least tolerant item in Table 4.1 was whether a least-liked group should be allowed to hold a public rally. This item registered 24% for tolerance and 52% for intolerance. Recurrent public rallies in Taipei since the lifting of martial law in July 1987 have caused traffic jams and sometimes mass violence on the street and a loss of business. It is likely that respondents in Taiwan might not want such disruptions to happen, although a public rally is a legal right. Statistical tests ($\chi^2 = 39.6$, 2df, $p < .05$) show that there are significant differences among these three countries for this item.

An interesting aspect in Table 4.1 is whether members of a least-liked group should be allowed to appear on TV (this item was not used in U.S. and Israel). The percentage tolerant (39%) was higher than intolerant (32%). As I mentioned in Chapter Three, "television and radio remained the exclusive domain of the KMT" (Sutter

1988:50), thereby denying DPP candidates access to the mass media during campaigns. Respondents in Taiwan might feel it fair to give every political party concerned reasonable time and access to the media, at least during the campaign period.

About the question of free speech for the most-disliked group: Table 4.1 showed that the registered tolerant score (37%) is slightly higher than intolerant score (36%). This might reflect the fact that competitive party systems and democratic tradition in Taiwan are so new that respondents still have to resolve whether to grant constitutional rights to members of their disliked group. Political minority groups also ceaselessly pose questions publicly concerning the national security and freedom of speech (i.e., Taiwan independence or the future status of Taiwan) that often are not welcomed by KMT conservatives. Under such circumstances, individuals might hold reticent attitudes concerning the freedom of speech of their least-liked group. This may explain why 36% of the respondents registered intolerant score. Yet, an overwhelming majority (85%) in the sample was educated at least at the college level. In comparing college educated and non-college educated with the tolerant (37%) and intolerant responses about freedom of speech, a Chi-square test shows that the effect of education on tolerance response is apparent ($\chi^2 = 4.8$, 1df, $p < .05$). Though the tolerant response of this item in Taiwan is close to Israel (38%), it is far lower than the U.S. (55%). A statistical test ($\chi^2 = 96.2$, 2df, $p < .05$) indicates that there are significant difference among these three countries.

On the basis of the evidence reviewed so far, public officials in Taiwan might be seen as slightly less tolerant than the general public in U.S. and Israel. However, Sullivan et al. (1985:119) have questioned how much attitudinal tolerance can be expected in the electorate in a democracy. Consequently, I would like to look at two

other criteria before making a final judgment of the extent to which Taiwanese public officials are intolerant.

The second criterion is whether there is an agreement about what group to repress. If respondents focus on one group instead of diversifying their selection, then a claim for intolerance can be made. Table 4.2 shows the pattern of target group selection in Taiwan.

Table 4.2: Least-Liked Group in Taiwan

Salient Political Minority Groups	Percentage of Least-Liked Group Being Chosen	N
Young China Party (R*)	0.9%	7
DDP Radical (L*)	33.3	276
China Democratic Socialist (R)	0.1	1
DDP Moderate (L)	4.0	33
Patriotic League (R)	7.7	64
Presbyterian Church (L)	6.9	57
Pro-Unification Nationalists (R)	0.7	6
World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), (L)	10.1	84
No Opinion**	36.2	300
Total	99.9%	828

* R represents right-wing group; L stands for left-wing group.
**We only mention "no opinion" group in this section; hereafter, this group will be taken out when doing statistical analysis.

The results reflect a high concentration on DPP radicals. Altogether, a bare majority (50.3%) of respondents in Taiwan selected left-wing groups (such as DDP radicals, Presbyterian Church, and World United Formosans for Independence)

favoring Taiwan independence; the DPP moderates were excluded because of their different ideological position. "To the extent that intolerance becomes focused on a particular group, political repression is the likely result" (Sullivan et al. 1982, Gibson and Tedin 1988:588). Before concluding that the target group selection pattern is highly focused, special attention should be paid on the "no opinion" category which accounted for 36.2% of the whole sample (its percentage was also higher than the DPP radicals).

Sullivan et al. (1985:144) claim that "the percentage not picking a least-liked group is probably to some degree a function of political involvement and knowledge". But such a claim may not be suitable for Taiwan's situation. One possible explanation is that civil liberties were not on the minds of these non-answering respondents in Taiwan, they just do not care or may have had the phrase "politics is dangerous" etched into their collective unconscious (Gold 1986:52). Another plausible explanation is that left-wing groups might perform some positive function such as pushing for KMT reform, but such a positive image might have been offset by negative aspects (for instance, a radical speech about independence or a violent public rally on the street). In sum, the evidence shows that caution should be used to interpret the data.

The third criterion is based on how strongly (intensely) respondents feel about constraining the rights and freedoms of political minority groups. Sullivan et al. (1985:129) argue that intensity of feeling may reduce (if tolerant) or increase (if intolerant) the potential for repression. Table 4.3 shows the percentage of the respondents who were strongly intolerant (SI) and strongly tolerant (ST) on each item of the tolerance scale of three countries and the ratio between SI and ST in Taiwan.

Table 4.3: Tolerance and Intensity: Percentage Strongly Intolerant (SI) and Strongly Tolerant (ST)*, and the Ratio (R) of SI to ST

	Taiwan			U.S.			Israel		
	SI	ST	Ratio	SI	ST	Rat	SI	ST	Rat
Teach	22.9%	1.8%	12.7	30%	3%	10	34%	7%	4.9
Run for public office	6.3	8.9	0.7	48	4	12	69	7	9.9
Outlawed	3.5	11.0	0.3	22	4	5.5	33	5	6.6
Rallies	16.8	1.8	9.3	12	2	6	21	6	3.5
Speech	10.1	2.6	3.9	11	4	2.8	24	7	3.4
Appear on TV	5.3	10.0	0.5						
(Phone Tapped)				5	14		11	16	

* The U.S. and Israel data were from Sullivan et al. (1985:130). Data are based on a five-point scale, with 1 representing SI and 5 ST.

The results indicate that on three (teach, rallies, and speech) of the six items, the percentage strongly intolerant was much greater than the percentage strongly tolerant. A particular aspect of these data is that the ratio of SI to ST of the same three items in Taiwan is greater than in the U.S. and Israel. On the other hand, the percentages of other two items (run for public office and outlawed) were reversed, and the ratio of SI to ST in Taiwan was much less than for the U.S. and Israel. The last item ("appear on TV") used in Taiwan can not be compared with that of the U.S. and Israel, since the latter two countries used different items. We can go further and test whether strongly intolerant and strongly tolerant with each item of the tolerance scale will be significantly different among these three countries. Concerning strongly intolerant with each tolerance item, statistical results show that there are significant differences among these three countries: χ^2=22.9, 2df, p< .05 for teach; χ^2=619.4, 2df, p< .05 for run office; χ^2=201.2, 2df, p< .05 for outlawed; χ^2=35.8, 2df, p< .05 for rallies; and χ^2=90.4,

2df, p< .05 for speech. Likewise for strongly tolerant: χ^2=34.6, 2df, p< .05 for teach; χ^2=22.6, 2df, p< .05 for run office; χ^2=39.2, 2df, p< .05 for outlawed; χ^2=35.2, 2df, p< .05 for rallies; and χ^2=19.7, 2df, p< .05 for speech. Table 4.3 suggests that as far as support for the civil liberties of their disliked groups is concerned, respondents in Taiwan are moderately intense, compared with the U.S. and Israel data.

Further examination of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicates that public officials in Taiwan are generally moderate on most questions. Table 4.4 shows the average percentage giving extreme responses on the major variables (in comparison with Israel and U.S. data).

Table 4.4: Percentage giving extreme response on items in each scale*

	Taiwan	U.S.	Israel
1.Dogmatism items (6 items)	7.5%	9.0%	22.0%
2.Self-esteem items (6 items)	5.8	16.0	25.0
3.Norms of democracy (12 items)	11.8	24.0	40.0
4.Tolerance items (6 items)	8.4	31.0	43.0
5.Threat items (6 items)	20.9	52.0	59.0
6.Individual modernity (10 items)	6.1		
7.Political efficacy (4 items)	3.7		
8.Motivation for media use (6 items)	6.1		
Average of items number 1-5 **	10.8	26.4	37.8

* This is the average percentage strongly agreeing or strongly disagreeing with the dogmatism, self-esteem, norms of democracy, and tolerance items (response 1 or 5). As to threat items, the average of the extreme response 1 or 7 on the 7-point scales was used. The U.S. and Israel data came from Sullivan et al. (1985:132).

** In order for comparison, items from number 6 thru 8 were not included.

An accurate comparison of these three countries may not be possible, as one item in the dogmatism scale and two items in the self-esteem scale used in Taiwan were

deleted. Including the omitted items only results in lower percentages: the new dogmatism percentage become 7.1%, and new self-esteem 5.2%. Also the norms of democracy scale is totally different from that used in the U.S.and Israel. Three more items of the tolerance scale were used in the U.S. and Israeli survey. Despite the difficulty of comparison, Taiwan's data in Table 4.4 generally showed moderate responses.

If the degree of threat helps produce a high degree of intolerance (Sullivan et al. 1985:142), an examination of the perceived threat variable is needed. The results presented in Table 4.5 reveal that public officials in Taiwan feel less threatened, with an average of 39% of all six items, in comparison with the U.S. (75%) and Israel (71%).

Table 4.5: Perceived Threat Variable*

	Percent regarding least-liked group as:		
	Taiwan	U.S.	Israel
1. Untrustworthy (vs. Trustworthy)	47%	71%	76%
2. Dangerous (vs. Safe)	43	82	80
3. Violent (vs. Non-Violent)	42	73	63
4. Bad (vs. Good)	33	81	72
5. Dishonest (vs. Honest)	34	66	62
6. Uncompromised (vs. Compromised)	35		
Average	39%	75%	71%

*The U.S. and Israel data were from Sullivan et al. (1985:109). The sixth item is created by this researcher. The perceived threat variable is measured on the basis of 7-point scale: 7 represents untrustworthy, and 1 stands for trustworthy. Missing cases are unavailable in U.S. and Israel data; missing cases have been taken out of the Taiwan data.

Moreover, Chi-square tests of each item with three nations show that there are significant differences of each item among three countries: χ^2=153.7, 2df, p< .05 for untrustworthy; χ^2=363.7, 2df, p< .05 for dangerous; χ^2=176.9, 2df, p< .05 for violent; χ^2=458.7, 2df, p< .05 for bad; χ^2=184.4, 2df, p< .05 for dishonest.

In sum, public officials in Taiwan do not show a clear pattern of low level of tolerance: certain aspects are relatively more tolerant than U.S. and Israel, some are relatively intolerant; many differences across the three countries are significant. The data also indicate that relatively few Taiwanese respondents give extreme responses to items on any scale, compared with U.S. and Israeli data. Though results reflect some concentration on the DPP radicals, respondents in Taiwan feel only moderately threatened by their least-liked group.

Social Bases of Target Group Selection

Previous research has suggested that the selection of a target group for intolerance is in part determined by the existence of social cleavages (Sullivan et al. 1985). This section will test hypotheses two through six described in Chapter Two to see to what extent the selection of a target group reflects major social cleavages in Taiwan.

Hypothesis 2: Highly educated public officials tend to select right-wing groups for intolerance; less educated officials select left-wing groups.

Table 4.6 presents the distribution of least-liked group by levels of education. The data reveal that those with low and medium levels of education are more likely to select left-wing groups. The results partially support the second hypothesis, although those with higher education tend to focus on left-wing groups as well. The findings are thus inconclusive. The reason might be that the right-wing groups in Taiwan are not so salient and radical as that of left-wing groups. Another plausible reason is that the higher education group, which is well represented, is where the hypothesis fails. A Chi-square test shows that there is no significant relationship between level of education and the selection of a left or right-wing target group (χ^2 = .65, d.f.= 1, P >.05).(In Tables 4.6 to 4.10, 'no opinion' responses will be excluded, and Chi-square tests are calculated on the basis of valid responses).

Table 4.6: Least-Liked Group by Level of Education

	Education	
Groups	Medium (High School and lower)	High (College Level)
Left*	87.9%	84.6%
Right**	12.1	15.4
N =	91	435

* Left groups include the DPP radical, DPP moderate, Presbyterian Church, and WUFI. See also Table 4.2 for more detail.

**Right-wing groups include Young China Party, China Democratic Socialist, Patriotic League, and Pro-Unification Nationalists.

Hypothesis 3: Older public officials are inclined to select left-wing groups; younger officials are closer to a 50-50 split.

There is no significant relationship between age and the selection of a target group (χ^2 = .11, d.f.=1, P > .05). The data in Table 4.7 reveal that both older and younger officials are inclined to select left-wing groups. The third hypothesis is thus partially rejected.

Table 4.7: Least-Liked Group by Age

	Age	
Groups	Younger (< 40 years)	Older (> or = 40)
Left	84.7%	85.7%
Right	15.3	14.3
N =	248	280

Hypothesis 4: Ethnically, Taiwanese officials are most likely to select a right-wing group; mainlanders a left-wing group.

Statistical results show that there are significant differences between ethnicity and the selection of target group (χ^2 = 25.8, d.f.=1, P < .05). The data in Table 4.8 demonstrate that almost all mainlander officials (96%) choose left-wing groups for intolerance, which partially support the fourth hypothesis. On the other hand, the fact that only about 21% of Taiwanese select right-wing groups rejects partially the fourth hypothesis.

Table 4.8: Least-Liked Group by Ethnicity

	Ethnicity	
Groups	Taiwanese	Mainlander
Left	79.5%	96.1%
Right	20.5	3.9
N =	347	180

Hypothesis 5: Officials living in urban areas tend to choose left-wing group; rural areas officials right-wing group.

Table 4.9: Least-Liked Group by Residence

	Residence	
Groups	Urban	Rural
Left	83.2%	86.4%
Right	16.8	13.6
N =	214	302

A statistical test shows no relationship between residence and the selection of target group ($\chi^2 = 1.04$, d.f.= 1, $P > .05$). The data in Table 4.9 indicate that officials living in both urban and rural areas tend to select left-wing groups to about the same degree, a finding inconsistent with the fifth hypothesis.

Hypothesis 6: Higher income officials are likely to pick left-wing-group; lower income officials right-wing.

No relationship appears between level of income and the selection of a target group ($\chi^2 = .68$, d.f.=1, $P > .05$). The data in Table 4.10 demonstrate that both high and low level income officials tend to choose left-wing groups which reject the sixth hypothesis.

Table 4.10: Least-Liked Group by Income*

	Income	
Groups	Low and Medium Level	High Level
Left	86.0%	83.1%
Right	14.0	16.9
N =	385	142

*The categories used for low and medium level, 50000 or less in New Taiwanese Dollars; and high, over 50001.

In sum, the argument that social cleavages form a basis for target group selection is only partially supported: education, age, residence, and income show no significant relationships with the selection of a target group; only ethnicity does. These results reinforces the argument in Chapter Three that ethnicity is the most important social cleavage in Taiwan.

Social, Psychological, Media, and Political Sources of Tolerance

The general level of tolerance in Taiwan and selection of a least-liked group have been discussed in the first part of this chapter. The following section will explore

the factors that influence the tolerance manifested by various types of respondents. Four sets of social, psychological, media, and political variables and their relationships with political tolerance will be investigated through the latent variable analysis outlined in Chapter Two.

Model Estimation

Assuming that the distribution of observed variables is multivariate joint normal, then the maximum-likelihood estimates of parameters of the hypothesized model in Figure 2.1 can be obtained by a "general method for the analysis of covariance structure"(Joreskog and Sorbom 1984). Using the LISREL program and a correlation matrix based on Table 4.11, model A fits the observed data perfectly ($\chi^2 = 0$, 0 df, p = 1.00). This hypothesized model is a fully saturated recursive model, since it "allows for the estimation of all possible causal paths" (i.e., lets γ be free), "but still retains the recursiveness of the system" (i.e., letting β lower triangular be free means that no two-way causation or feedback causal loops can exist between variables) (Carmines 1986:47). Moreover, this model is an "exactly identified model" (Carmines 1986:38) or a "just determined model" (Loehlin 1987:16). That is, the number of parameters estimated is the same as the number of observed variances and covariances. Such a model is not scientifically interesting as it can never be rejected (Carmins 1986:38, Loehlin 1987:65). Therefore another specification of the model is introduced to meet the "overidentified" condition so that its number of parameters to be estimated is smaller than the number of variances and covariances. Based on Model A, Model B eliminates the five direct paths between the exogenous variables and tolerance. Constraining these

Table 4.11: Correlations, Standard Deviations (SD) for Political Tolerance Study in Taiwan (N = 828)

	Edu	Age	Resid	Ethn	Incom	Dog	Esteem	Value	Mdty	Media	Effy	Norm	Thrt	Tol
Edu	1.000													
Age	-.391	1.000												
Resid	-.341	.165	1.000											
Ethn.	.011	.191	-.153	1.000										
Incom	.285	-.101	-.263	.002	1.000									
Dog	-.373	.371	.222	.066	-.182	1.000								
Esteem	.156	-.128	-.087	-.050	.162	-.278	1.000							
Value	.134	-.055	-.090	.013	.097	-.160	.115	1.000						
Mdty	.385	-.383	-.231	-.011	.234	-.576	.226	.125	1.000					
Media	-.121	.121	.037	.094	-.044	.150	-.017	.025	-.113	1.000				
Effy	.047	.062	-.031	.043	.107	-.030	.257	.134	-.019	.174	1.000			
Norm	.215	-.180	-.164	.063	.191	-.381	.163	.117	.475	-.045	.025	1.000		
Thrt	.053	-.009	-.007	.116	.124	.005	.095	.009	.044	.043	.058	.097	1.000	
Tol.	.123	-.213	-.061	-.199	.020	-.247	.052	.046	.307	-.081	-.031	.142	-.311	1.000
SD	.375	.403	.514	.449	1.646	3.816	3.835	1.235	4.157	4.170	2.313	4.896	7.915	4.845

paths to be zero leads to a bad fit of the model ($\chi^2 = 29.54$, 5 df, $p < .05$). Based on this evidence, it can be concluded that some demographic variables do have direct effects on political tolerance.

Model A contains many parameters that are statistically insignificant, i.e., "parameters whose t-values are less than two in magnitude are normally judged to be not different from zero" (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984:III.12). Constraining these paths to be zero results in a reasonably well-fitting model, model C ($\chi^2 = 52.67$, 53 df, $p > .30$), although the goodness of the fit is presumably somewhat exaggerated because of capitalization on chance. Model D, with five more paths (that I am theoretically interested in) allowed to be free: γ_{91}, β_{91}, β_{92}, β_{95}, β_{97}, preserves the satisfactory fit of Model C ($\chi^2 = 48.85$, 48 df, $p > .30$), but does not improve it . The difference in χ^2 between Model C and Model D is 3.82, with 5 degrees of freedom. This means that the decrease in χ^2 due to respecification is not statistically significant at the .05 level. Thus, model D does not demonstrate an improvement in fit. Hence, Model C will be used as a basic model to test the seventh and eighth hypotheses. Figure 4.1 provides the standardized solution to the path diagram of Model C.



Figure 4.1 : Solution to the Path Diagram of Model C

Hypothesis 7: The effect of education, age, residence, ethnicity, and income on tolerance are weak.

Hypothesis 8: The effect of psychological, media and political variables on tolerance are significant.

Figure 4.1 shows that ethnicity, one of the demographic variables does have a direct negative impact on political tolerance (-.16). It means that mainlanders tend to be more intolerant than Taiwanese. This evidence reinforces the argument from Chapter Three that ethnicity is the most important social cleavage existing in Taiwan. Therefore, it is useful to include a county's political context in the study of political tolerance. The other four social variables have weak effects on tolerance as expected. The statistical results confirm Sullivan et al.'s (1985) argument that education does not promote tolerance. In short, the seventh hypothesis should be rejected with respect to ethnicity, but not for the remaining social variables.

Concerning psychological variables, Figure 4.1 shows that 'individual modernity' has the strongest direct impact on tolerance (.33); 'dogmatism' influences tolerance indirectly through individual modernity; 'self-esteem' affects tolerance slightly ((-0.8) times (-.31) = .02) and indirectly via perceived threat; and 'value' has no effect on tolerance. Individual modernity may reflect freedom from dogma as well as a readiness for new experiences and social change. Thus, a person with a high degree of openness to change may be ready for new ideas or values and prone to cognitive flexibility. This should promote tolerance. The media variable only affects norms of democracy (.18) and does not affect tolerance; thus that part of the eighth hypothesis will be rejected. However, this does not rule out the possibility that efforts still need to

be made for TVs and newspapers in Taiwan to provide rooms for debates between both contending parties concerning controversial public policies, especially different political ideas such as independence and unification.

Figure 4.1 also indicates that political efficacy affects political tolerance slightly and indirectly through perceived threat. Norms of democracy have no effect on political tolerance. Perceived threat has the second strongest impact on political tolerance (-.31), next to individual modernity. The reason why norms of democracy do not affect tolerance may be that different scale used. The negatively high path coefficient (-.31) from threat to tolerance signalled that "the greater the threat that is perceived, the less tolerance exists" (Sullivan et al. 1985:241). According to this model, only a strong individual modernity that provides openness to new ideas and cognitive flexibility can overcome such a disposition. As a result, the eighth hypothesis has been shown to have partial validity. Figure 4.2 shows that , in Israel, norms of democracy have little impact on tolerance (.16), while perceived threat exerts a tremendous effect on tolerance (-.68). The plausible explanation is that Israel has a different historical context of democratic theory and practice, and real threats from Arab countries have made the effect of democratic norms inferior to other values (Sullivan et al 1985:216). The U.S. exhibits a somewhat different picture. Figure 4.3 indicates that norms of democracy have a moderately strong influence on tolerance (.34), comparable to that of (-.37). In the U.S., norms of democracy have "served as a conduit for liberals to express their greater degree of tolerance" (Sullivan et al 1985:216). In addition, the American public's unrealistically high level of perceived threat may come from the U.S. presidents strategies to increase their popularity through "adopting an aggressive stance



Figure 4.2: Israeli Results
(Data from Sullivan et al. 1985:212)



Figure 4.3: U.S.Resu'ts
(Data from Sullivan et al. 1985:213)

toward the Soviet Union and by generating crises and diplomatic activities" (Sullivan et al. 1985:144).

In sum, the evidence described here confirms Sullivan et al.'s (1985) argument that the explanatory power of political variables varies across nations, and supports the claim that in the study of political tolerance contextual factors must be taken into consideration .

Hypothesis 9: There will be no significant differences in model structure or parameters among these three groups, i.e., the Executive Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial Government, and County governments.

Based on the basic model of Model C, this section will simultaneously estimate a model (called Model E) that use three separate data sets, one from each of the three levels of government. The model structure and parameter values are required to be invariant across three groups. Tables 4.12, 4.13, 4.14 show data of the three groups. On the whole, Model E fits very badly ($\chi^2 = 683$, 263 df, $p < .05$). Through examining modification indices (MI) provided by LISREL, there are four paths (β_{62}, β_{65}, β_{74}, β_{91}) with MI larger than five, which indicates that these parameters should be set free and the model reestimated (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984:III.18-19). The revised model (Model F, see appendix) fits better, though still not well ($\chi^2 = 505.7$, 259 df, $p < .05$). The difference, a χ^2 of 177.3 with 4 df, demonstrates a large improvement in

Table 4.12: Correlations, Standard Deviation (SD) for Group One: the Executive Yuan (N = 306)

	Edu	Age	Resid	Ethn	Incom	Dog	Esteem	Value	Mdty	Media	Effy	Norm	Thrt	Tol
Edu	1.000													
Age	-.301	1.000												
Resid	-.091	.017	1.000											
Ethn.	-.083	.184	-.035	1.000										
Incom	.242	-.034	-.171	-.008	1.000									
Dog	-.366	.215	.134	.066	-.197	1.000								
Esteem	.161	-.097	-.057	-.045	.099	-.245	1.000							
Value	.144	.068	-.100	.038	.095	-.147	.080	1.000						
Mdty	.295	-.212	-.132	.004	.204	-.537	.280	.110	1.000					
Media	-.040	.078	-.001	.112	.009	.076	.010	.055	.005	1.000				
Effy	.017	.072	-.051	.075	.094	-.113	.335	.160	.034	.210	1.000			
Norm	.148	-.084	-.140	.030	.148	-.422	.172	.045	.493	.049	.116	1.000		
Thrt	-.035	-.090	.111	.048	.197	-.060	.077	-.121	.079	-.071	.058	.153	1.000	
Tol.	.108	-.204	-.019	-.234	.011	-.280	.116	.053	.231	-.068	-.047	.101	-.361	1.000
SD	.800	.861	.357	.494	1.758	3.626	3.864	1.250	3.675	4.432	2.393	5.102	6.676	5.062

Table 4.13: Correlations, Standard Deviations (SD) for Group Two: the Taiwan Provincial Government (N = 292)

	Edu	Age	Resid	Ethn	Incom	Dog	Esteem	Value	Mdty	Media	Effy	Norm	Thrt	Tol
Edu	1.000													
Age	-.493	1.000												
Resid	-.114	.083	1.000											
Ethn.	-.150	.305	.052	1.000										
Incom	.240	-.113	-.136	-.049	1.000									
Dog	-.374	.417	.102	.194	-.116	1.000								
Esteem	.172	-.151	.047	-.140	.179	-.342	1.000							
Value	.165	-.092	-.164	.021	.120	-.167	.060	1.000						
Mdty	.379	-.453	-.088	-.100	.209	-.568	.214	.148	1.000					
Media	-.155	.057	-.065	.099	-.010	.145	-.059	-.007	-.109	1.000				
Effy	.074	.064	.007	.053	.091	.002	.211	.076	-.066	.169	1.000			
Norm	.141	-.226	-.010	-.023	.113	-.346	.190	.209	.447	-.065	-.053	1.000		
Thrt	.110	-.043	.056	.120	.062	-.030	.075	.082	.075	.035	.104	.100	1.000	
Tol.	.162	-.222	-.154	-.253	-.016	-.222	.033	.018	.379	-.020	-.159	.183	-.353	1.000
SD	1.027	1.113	.386	.420	1.520	3.891	3.943	1.217	4.129	4.080	2.260	4.602	8.607	4.279

Table 4.14: Correlations, Standard Deviations (SD) for Group Three: County Governments (N = 228)

	Edu	Age	Resid	Ethn	Incom	Dog	Esteem	Value	Mdty	Media	Effy	Norm	Thrt	Tol
Edu	1.000													
Age	-.181	1.000												
Resid	-.058	.019	1.000											
Ethn.	-.060	.279	.037	1.000										
Incom	.119	.015	-.080	-.182	1.000									
Dog	-.190	.380	.108	.102	-.061	1.000								
Esteem	.042	-.072	-.151	.007	.169	-.183	1.000							
Value	.096	-.119	-.034	.051	.055	-.168	.232	1.000						
Mdty	.262	-.348	-.059	-.161	.121	-.555	.137	.119	1.000					
Media	-.106	.220	.029	.148	.009	.224	.021	.026	-.218	1.000				
Effy	.017	.084	.017	-.048	.133	.067	-.192	.163	-.057	.130	1.000			
Norm	.202	-.127	-.030	.079	.208	-.284	.063	.098	.420	-.120	-.040	1.000		
Thrt	-.053	.158	.035	.163	.060	.176	.121	.023	-.087	.198	.001	-.037	1.000	
Tol.	.058	-.211	.085	-.178	.046	-.229	-.007	.071	.312	-.150	.135	.143	-.226	1.000
SD	.916	1.135	.377	.365	1.442	3.675	3.587	1.240	4.351	3.916	2.272	4.708	8.209	5.243

fit. In either case, however, the ninth hypothesis must be rejected. It means that there exist substantial differences among these three groups.

Hypothesis 10: There are no quantitative differences among the three groups in the various parameters of the model.

Based on the basic model of Model C, we require the model structure to be the same and allow quantitative values to be different in three groups to estimate a model (called model G). Data were used from Table 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14. On the whole, Model G fits very badly ($\chi^2 = 442.9$, 159 df, $p < .05$). Using the same modification indices procedure suggested by Model E to free the same paths and reestimate, the revised model (Model H, see appendix) yields a χ^2 of 247.6 for 147 df. Model H fits the data reasonably well in terms of using the ratio of χ^2 to its degrees of freedom to be less than two as a criteria of model fitting (Joreskog and Sorbom 1979:39; Loehlin 1987:67). In addition, the difference between the two χ^2s of Model E and Model H, (435.4), when tested as a χ^2 with 116 df, shows a significant improvement in fit. It means that tenth hypothesis must be rejected.

From Model H, I can go further and constrain the values of certain paths to be the same in three groups, but allow others to vary to see whether the constrained paths produce significant differences among these three groups. These specific paths come from the modification indices provided by the Model F LISREL result, and from particular theoretical interests such as the path from ethnicity to tolerance, the path from individual modernity to tolerance, and the path from perceived threat to tolerance. They

are β_{42}, β_{63}, β_{71}, β_{74}, β_{83}, β_{91}, β_{98}, ζ_{88}, γ_{94}, β_{94}. Table 4.15 shows the results under different equality constrains.

Table 4.15: Tests of hypotheses for the political tolerance model in three groups

	χ^2	df	χ^2_{diff}	df_{diff}	p
1.Unconstrained Model H	247.6	147			
2.Equal β_{71}	251.4	149	3.8	2	>.05
3.Equal β_{74}	248.5	149	0.9	2	>.05
4.Equal β_{91}	257.4	149	9.8	2	<.05
5.Equal β_{98}	257.8	149	10.2	2	<.05
6.Equal ζ_{88}	269.0	149	21.4	2	<.05
7.Equal β_{94}	252.4	149	4.8	2	>.05
8.Equal γ_{94}	248.0	149	0.4	2	>.05

Note: 2 thru 8 tested against 1.

Line 2 indicates that the model constraining β_{71} (i.e., path from dogmatism to norms of democracy) to be the same among three groups is not statistically significant. The same situation applies to line 3 for β_{74} (path from individual modernity to norms of democracy), line 7 for β_{94} (path from individual modernity to tolerance), and line 8 for γ_{94} (path from ethnicity to tolerance). It means that the above four parameters can be considered the same across all groups. Line 4 indicates that model constraining β_{91} (path from dogmatism to tolerance) to be the same among three groups is statistically significant. The same situation applies to line 5 for β_{98} (path from perceived threat to tolerance), and line 6 for ζ_{88} (residual variance of perceived threat). It indicates that these three parameters differ across groups. With regard to β_{98}, the largest threat perceived in the three groups is by the Executive Yuan (-.462), followed by the Taiwan

Provincial government (-.292) and then by county governments (-.186). One reason for this ordering is that public officials working in the Executive Yuan, which is located in Taipei, have much more first-hand experience with public rallies and violence on the street than the other two levels of government. For public officials in the Executive Yuan, the greater the perceived threat from their least-liked group, the less tolerance exists. As for β_{91}, the most dogmatic in the three groups is the Executive Yuan (-.225), followed by county government (-.047), and then the Taiwan Provincial government (.034). Rokeach argues that to defend against threatening aspects of reality, "the belief system will become dogmatic and the tendency to reject disbelieved views will be strong" (Sullivan et al. 1982:154). If Rokeach's explanation is correct, and since public officials in the Executive Yuan perceived the largest threat, it is no surprise that they show themselves to be the most dogmatic of the three groups.

Let us now examine the paths that connect with tolerance. Based on the above evidence, paths connecting ethnicity with tolerance (γ_{94}) and modernity with tolerance (β_{94}) do not have significant differences among three groups; the path connecting perceived threat with tolerance (β_{98}) does make a significant difference among three groups. Statistical results show that ethnicity (a social variable), individual modernity (a psychological variable), and perceived threat (a political variable) all have direct impacts on tolerance. These results reject previous research findings that showed no effect of social variables on tolerance. In addition, the effects of psychological variables on tolerance are different from previous research; only individual modernity (this variable is newly added), has a strong effect on tolerance, whereas dogmatism, self-esteem, and value have no impact on tolerance at all. Moreover, this study confirms that several political variables (such as perceived threat) can be powerful indicators, although

results vary across nations. Statistical results further indicate that quantitative differences among three groups in the various parameters of the model are significant. Finally, the overall level of tolerance has been assessed using three criteria and can be characterized as showing no clear pattern of low tolerance. The selection of a target group for intolerance reflects the major social cleavage in Taiwan: ethnicity.

The next chapter will summarize the major findings of this study, followed by discussion of this study's implications, and its limitations, and suggestions for future research.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

Summary of Findings

Our findings may be grouped into three categories. The first involves the overall level of political tolerance; the second, the manner in which the target group is selected as a reflection of social cleavages; and the third, the structural relationships in the latent variable model that account for individual differences in tolerance.

Three criteria were used to assess the overall level of political tolerance, and U.S. and Israeli data were used to characterize Taiwan's respondents as tolerant or intolerant. The first criterion used is the percentages of tolerant responses. In Taiwan, some items (such as "run for public office", "outlawed") are relatively tolerant compared to the U.S. and Israel and some are not (such as "teach", "rallies", "speech"), many differences across the three countries are significant. The second criterion is whether there is agreement about which group to repress. Though data reflect some concentration on the DPP radicals (33.3%), respondents in Taiwan feel far less threatened from their least-liked group (39%) compared with the U.S. (75%) and Israel (71%). Chi-square tests show differences of perceived threat among these three countries are strongly significant. The third criterion is the ratio of the percentage strongly intolerant to strongly tolerant. The result shows the same pattern as 'the percentages of tolerant response': some ratios (such as for "teach", "rallies", and "speech") are greater than in the U.S. and Israel, others (such as "run for public office", and "outlawed") are not. Furthermore, the percentage giving extreme responses on items in each scale is quite low (10.8%) in comparison with the U.S. (26.4%) and

Israel (37.8%). Judging from the above evidence, I conclude that the Taiwanese respondents' overall level of tolerance is not especially low.

With respect to target group selection, we wished to know to what extent the selection of a target group reflects existing social cleavages in Taiwan. The results show that there is a strong relationship between ethnicity and the selection of a target group. Statistical tests show no relationship between other social variables, such as education, age, residence, and income, and the selection of target group. The finding of ethnicity to Taiwan in the selection of target group is consistent with the role of "race to the U.S. and religiosity to Israel" (Sullivan et al. 1985:171).

Regarding the results of a latent variable model for individual difference in tolerance, the factors most strongly related to tolerance are individual modernity (a psychological construct), followed by perceived threat from target groups (a political variable), and ethnicity (a social variable). These results reject previous research that showed no effect of social variables on tolerance. The results of ethnicity show that mainlanders are relatively more intolerant than Taiwanese, thus empirically reinforcing the argument in Chapter Three that mainlanders "value stability in the existing political system, pursue higher levels of social harmony and political order, and are willing to constrain individual freedom if necessary" (Hu and Yu 1983:38). By contrast, Taiwanese "value the protection of civil liberties, freedom of speech, broader political participation, the sharing of political power, and the enhancement of Taiwanese status and influence in society and politics" (Hu and Yu 1983:38). Hence, Taiwanese appear to be willing to put up with political minority groups that they object to more than do mainlanders. The effects of psychological variables on tolerance are also different from previous research: only individual modernity (this variable is new) has a strong effect

on tolerance, whereas dogmatism, self-esteem, and value had no significant impact on tolerance at all. A person with a high degree of openness to change may be ready for new ideas or values and prone to cognitive flexibility, thus promoting tolerance. In addition, the results (along with U.S. and Israeli data) confirm that several political variables such as norms of democracy and perceived threat (only the latter was effective in Taiwan) can be powerful indicators, although path values vary across nations.

Through testing and comparing various models, statistical results indicate that there exist substantial differences in the model across the Executive Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial Government, and county governments. If I then go further, and require that the model structure be the same and allow quantitative values to be different, the model fits the data reasonably well, meaning that there exist different quantitative values among the three groups in the various parameters of the model. Based on preceding model's modification indices and my own theoretical interest, I then constrain the values of certain paths (for instance, β_{71}, β_{74}, β_{91}, β_{98}, ζ_{88}, β_{94}, and γ_{94}) to be the same in three groups, but allow others to vary to see whether the constrained paths have significant differences among these three groups. The results show that some parameters differ across groups, such as paths from dogmatism to tolerance, from perceived threat to tolerance, the residual path of perceived threat; while some parameters are the same across groups, such as paths from dogmatism to norms of democracy, from individual modernity to norms of democracy, from individual modernity to tolerance, and from ethnicity to tolerance.

Having recapitulated the major empirical results, the strength and weakness of this study and its implications in terms of theoretical and methodological considerations

need to be discussed. The strength of this research lies in the model specification. We have not only included variables from previous research, but have also incorporated variables and scales that suit Taiwan's specific context, such as ethnicity, media use, individual modernity, and norms of democracy. A latent variable model is employed to evaluate the many constructs in this study simultaneously. Another strength is model comparison. We began with testing whether a model of the same structure can be fitted to three independent groups. If it cannot, then we tested to see whether there are quantitative differences among the three groups in the various parameters of the model. if it can be fitted, then we went further to constrain the values of certain paths to be the same in three groups, but allowed others to vary to see whether the constrained paths were significantly different among these three groups. It is only through model comparisons that one "begins to learn something of their relative merits" (Loehlin 1987:107). Finally, attitudinal tolerance appear to be an important component of political culture. The study of political attitudes involves "an examination of the states of mind which underlie political traditions and political institutions" (Sullivan et al. 1982:51). Hence, understanding public officials' attitudinal tolerance is a starting point for further comprehending Taiwanese political culture.

Limitations

The weaknesses of this study comes from the availability of comparison data, model specification and model estimation. Regarding the comparison data used in this study, data available from the U.S. and Israel are not for public officials, but for the population as a whole. Concerning the model specification, the hypothesized model is

restricted by being recursive, (i.e., no two-way causation or feedback causal loops between variables and residuals), a condition that seems unrealistic. For instance, media use and psychological variables may well affect each other. Both open-minded and dogmatic persons may tend to watch or read specific kinds of news, which in turn may strengthen and justify their preconceptualized attitudes or opinions. Moreover, the miscellaneous residual causes that influence a given variable might be correlated with other residual causes in the model, such as residuals among psychological variables. Under such circumstances, the fact that "one model fits the data reasonably well does not mean that there could not be other, different models that fit better" (Loehlin 1987:62). With respect to model estimation, latent variable analysis can only estimate the relationships among existing variables in the model. If new variables were included, (such as individual modernity in this study), the estimation may change.

Implications

The findings have important implications. Figure 4.1 contain one chain of paths that is worth mentioning: individual modernity is influenced directly by education and indirectly through dogmatism, suggesting that through education or "social learning" (McClosky and Brill 1983) one can become less dogmatic as well as ready for new experience and social change. This should promote tolerance. McClosky and Brill (1983:416) argue that:

> "whatever broadens one's perspective tends to generate empathy and promote tolerance by making one aware of the extraordinary variety of standards and forms of social organization under which different people have lived".

One of the most efficient ways of social learning may come from media, including newspapers and television. This study shows that media use has positive effect on norms of democracy (.18), but no effect on tolerance. It implies that media use has nothing to do with tolerance of political minority groups. The reason might be that the respondents do not have much chance to view and contemplate the ideas and policies that political minority groups espouse. We are optimistic, however, that media use performs some functions that are conducive to support norms of democracy. We expect, in the long run, that mass media can carry out more democratic education by providing the pros and cons of current policy issues that can influence directly on tolerance. The model in Figure 4.1 also shows that perceived threat has a high negative impact on tolerance (-.31), which signals that "the greater the threat that is perceived, the less tolerance exists" (Sullivan et al. 1985:241). According to this model, strong individual modernity that provides openness to new ideas and cognitive flexibility can offset such a disposition. In addition, this model also indicates that, when other variables are held constant, mainlanders are more intolerant of political minority groups they dislike most than are Taiwanese. Decision-makers should pay special attention to such findings and change current policies, if necessary.

Suggestions for Future Research

If the framework of analysis in this study is applicable to other developing countries, then similarities and differences can be compared and generalizations can be derived. This study could be taken one step further to compare specific agencies within the bureaucracy, such as defense-related, social-economic related, or staff-related

agencies, to see which agencies can be characterized as tolerant or intolerant. Under such circumstances, tolerant attitudes and public policy could be linked. Repressive public policy or laws may reflect the intolerance of individual members in some agencies.

Moreover, this study can also be treated as a starting point for future longitudinal comparisons. Subjects could be public officials, mass publics, or various elite strata. The difference in levels of tolerance or intolerance between elites and non-elites could thus be examined and factors influencing tolerant attitudes could be compared.

Finally, it would be worthwhile to examine the relationship between the learning of norms of tolerance or civil liberties and democratic viability.

APPENDIX

Demographic Information

Sex:

_____Male
_____Female

Age:

_____Under 19
_____20-29
_____30-39
_____40-49
_____50-59
_____60 or over

Educational Background:

_____Graduate School
_____University and/ or College
_____Military and/or Police School
_____Senior High School
_____Junior High School
_____Elementary School

Nationality:

_____Taiwanese
_____Mainlander

Position:

_____Supervisor
_____Non-supervisor

Grade (General Schedule Rating):

_____GS10-GS14 (Supergrades)
_____GS6-GS9 (Middle grade)
_____GS3-GS5
_____GS1-GS2
_____Others

Working Place:

_____The Executive Yuan
_____Taiwan Provincial Government
_____City or County Government

Residence:

_____Metropolitan or City
_____Rural

Monthly Total Family Income (in New Taiwanese Dollars):

_____Under 15000
_____15001-20000
_____20001-30000
_____30001-40000
_____40001-50000
_____50001-60000
_____60001-70000
_____70001 or Over

Self-Esteem Scale

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5

1. I do many things which I regret afterwards.	1 2 3 4 5
2. I never try to do more than I can, for fear of failure.	1 2 3 4 5
3. A large number of people are guilty of bad sexual conduct.(D*)	1 2 3 4 5
4. There is no such thing as being "too strict" where conscience and morals are concerned.(D)	1 2 3 4 5
5. I think that in some ways I am really an unworthy person.	1 2 3 4 5
6. When I look back on it, I guess I really haven't gotten as much out of life as I had once hoped.	1 2 3 4 5
7. People today have forgotten how to feel properly ashamed of themselves.	1 2 3 4 5
8. I often have the feeling I have done something wrong or evil.	1 2 3 4 5

*D means deleted, for its poor correlation with other items in each scale. This rule applies to all scales.

Dogmatism Scale

1. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one which is correct.	1 2 3 4 5
2. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.	1 2 3 4 5
3. A group which tolerates too many differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.	1 2 3 4 5
4. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.	1 2 3 4 5
5. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.	1 2 3 4 5
6. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.	1 2 3 4 5
7. Most people just don't know what's good for them.(D)	1 2 3 4 5

Individual Modernity

1. In order to maintain good behavior, long-haired individuals should be supervised by police.	1 2 3 4 5
2. A wife has the right to remarry if her husband dies.	1 2 3 4 5
3. Sex education should be taught with open discussion in a proper way.	1 2 3 4 5
4. Keeping silent in a dispute is the best policy.	1 2 3 4 5

5. It is not bad to show one's own knowledge and expertise as the occasion demands. 1 2 3 4 5

6. It is not fair to turn your back on one lover and go to another. 1 2 3 4 5

7. Concerning festivals, wedding ceremonies, and funerals, we should follow the traditional way and not change. 1 2 3 4 5

8. Teaching is such a noble profession that teachers should not ask for more pay. 1 2 3 4 5

9. Laws should be enacted to make induced abortion legal. 1 2 3 4 5

10. The way of judging whether an idea is correct is not through repetitive discussions among people, but through the judgment of few elites. 1 2 3 4 5

Norms of Democracy Scale

N_1. It is a public official's duty to do his job as best as he can; as to other social, academic, or entertainment activities with which government agency should not interfere. (D) 1 2 3 4 5

N_2. Even a man that I am disgusted at ought to have a chance to say what he want to say. 1 2 3 4 5

N_3. In order to promote administrative efficiency, the director of a government agency should have the right to deal directly with public officials that have broken regulations rather than wait for the personnel evaluation process which might cause delay. (D) 1 2 3 4 5

N_4. Though your supervisor may make a mistake, you shouldn't argue with him. 1 2 3 4 5

N_5. Members of the ruling party (KMT) have the right and priority to interfere with every aspect of the agency's affairs. 1 2 3 4 5

N_6. Public officials should give special services to those persons who have a strong political backing. 1 2 3 4 5

N_7. Women are not suitable to be supervisors. 1 2 3 4 5

N_8. The director of an agency is like a father in a family: everyone should comply with his decision rather than pose different opinions. 1 2 3 4 5

N_9. Government agencies will solve your problems and work for you, , so you don't need to petition for anything else. 1 2 3 4 5

N_{10}. Letting a subordinate take the initiative in making decisions sometimes works much better than requiring him to go through his supervisor. 1 2 3 4 5

N_{11}. For the purpose of faithfully carrying out his duties, a public official should only obey and implement orders from above; he can ignore public opinions. 1 2 3 4 5

N_{12}. The legislature has the right to set limits on the power of the executive agency. (D) 1 2 3 4 5

N_{13}. It will not hurt the government's dignity even if the courts rule against the government. 1 2 3 4 5

N_{14}. Public officials to should not take the punishment, penalty and civil responsibilities when they violate citizens' freedom and rights by doing their duties. 1 2 3 4 5

N_{15}. Government agencies should not always submit to the legislature, if they feel confident that they are working for the people's welfare,

they can fight for their point of view and appeal to public opinion for arbitration. 1 2 3 4 5

Political Efficacy Scale

1. Today's society is so complicated that even though I work harder than before, I cannot do anything to improve the current situation. 1 2 3 4 5
2. Public officials like me can sometimes affect the implementation of objectives of the agency. 1 2 3 4 5
3. My opinion is always accepted higher up in my department. 1 2 3 4 5
4. If I request changes to some bad regulations or measures in a proper way in my department, such efforts are in vain. 1 2 3 4 5

Value Scale

Would you look at this list of values and select the one most important to you ?

Comfortable life_____ Safety_____ Affection_____

Esteem_____ Self-actualization/ Originality_____

Don't know_____

Media Use Scale

1. About how often do you watch TV ?

Three or four times a day_____ One or two times a day_____

Three or four times a week_____ One or two times a week_____

Less often than one time a week_____

2. About how often do you read a daily newspaper ?

Every day_____ Three or four days a week_____ Once or twice a week____

Once or twice a month_____ never_____

3. When you read a daily newspaper, how often do you read the following sections?

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Always
3.1 Political news	_____	_____	_____	_____
3.2 Editorials or columns	_____	_____	_____	_____
3.3 Economic/financial news	_____	_____	_____	_____
3.4 Letters to the editor	_____	_____	_____	_____

4. When you watch TV, how often do you watch the following programs?

4.1 National news	_____	_____	_____	_____
4.2 News magazine programs	_____	_____	_____	_____
4.3 TV debates	_____	_____	_____	_____

5. People read informational news in the newspapers and watch TV news or news magazine programs for different reasons. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the statement.

5.1 To get recent information about my own area of interest.	1 2 3 4 5
5.2 To get ideas to talk about politics with others.	1 2 3 4 5
5.3 To get information from opposing or matching points of view.	1 2 3 4 5
5.4 To help me make daily life decisions.	1 2 3 4 5
5.5 Has become a habit.	1 2 3 4 5
5.6 To relax.	1 2 3 4 5

Political Tolerance Scale

* Here is a list of groups in politics. Which of these groups do you like the least ?If there is some group that you like less than other groups listed here, please tell me the name of that group.

_____ Youth China Party

_____ Social Democratic Party

_____ The DPP Radicals

_____ The DPP Moderates

_____ Pro-Unification Nationalists

_____ World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI)

_____ Taiwan Presbyterian Church

_____ Patriotic League

Some other group (specify)_____

_____ Uncertain; No opinion.

Then I would like you to tell me how much you agree with the following statements:

1. (Members of the) least-liked group should be allowed to teach in public schools. 1 2 3 4 5
2. (Members of the) least-liked group should be banned from being a legislator or running for public officials 1 2 3 4 5
3. The least-liked group should be outlawed. 1 2 3 4 5
4. (Members of the) least-liked group should be allowed to make a speech in the city. 1 2 3 4 5
5. The least-liked group should be allowed to hold public rallies in

the city. 1 2 3 4 5

6. (Members of the) least-liked group should not appear on mass media which was operated by the government. 1 2 3 4 5

7. This list has pairs of adjectives on it which can be used to described the group you like the least. Taking them one at a time, please tell me which of the two adjectives best describes the group you like the least in your personal view. For example, the first pair of adjectives is trustworthy-untrustworthy. If you think the least-liked group is very trustworthy, give me the number 1. If you think they are very untrustworthy, give me the number 7. Let the numbers 2 to 6 represent various degrees of strength, with 4 in the middle (neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy). So you are to give me a number between 1 and 7.

	Trustworthy						Untrustworthy
7.1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Safe						Dangerous
7.2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Non-violent						Violent
7.3.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Good						Bad
7.4.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Honest						Dishonest
7.5.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Compromised						Uncompromised
7.6	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

LISREL input for Model F

```
GROUP 1: THE EXECUTIVE YUAN
DA NG=3 NI=14 NO=306 MA=CM
CM FU UN=9 FO
(8F10.7/6F10.7)
SD
.800 .861 .357 .494 1.758 3.626 3.864 1.250 3.675 4.432 2.393 5.102 6.676 5.062
LA
'EDU' 'AGE' 'RESID' 'ETHN' 'INCOM' 'DOG' 'ESTEEM' 'VALUE' 'MDTY'
'MEDIA' 'EFFY' 'NORM' 'THRT' 'TOL'
SE
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5
MO NX=5 NK=5 NY=9 NE=9 LX=SY,FI LY=SY,FI BE=SD PS=DI TD=ZE TE=FI
FIX    BE (3 2) BE (4 2)-BE (5 1) BE (6 3) BE (7 2) BE (7 3) BE (7 6) BE (8 1)  C
       BE (8 3)-BE (8 5) BE (8 7) BE (9 2) BE (9 3) BE (9 5)-BE (9 7)
FIX    GA (1 4) GA (2 1)-GA (2 4) GA (3 1)-GA(3 5) GA (4 3) GA (4 4)            C
       GA (5 1) GA (5 3) GA (5 4) GA (6 1)-GA (6 3) GA (7 1)-GA (7 3)           C
       GA (7 5) GA (8 1)-GA (8 3) GA (9 1)-GA (9 3) GA (9 5)
FIX    PH (4 1) PH (5 4)
ST 1.0 LX (1 1) LX (2 2) LX (3 3) LX (4 4) LX (5 5)
ST .8427 LY (1 1)
ST .8266 LY (2 2)
ST 1.0 LY (3 3)
ST .8013 LY (4 4)
ST .7956 LY (5 5)
ST .7411 LY (6 6)
ST .8155 LY (7 7)
ST .9663 LY (8 8)
ST .9280 LY (9 9)
ST .2898 TE (1 1)
ST .3167 TE (2 2)
ST .0000 TE (3 3)
ST .3579 TE (4 4)
ST .3670 TE (5 5)
ST .4508 TE (6 6)
ST .3349 TE (7 7)
ST .0662 TE (8 8)
ST .1338 TE (9 9)
OU SS SE TV EF RS MI TM=300
GROUP 2: THE TAIWAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
DA NO=294 MA=CM
CM FU UN=8 FO
(8F10.7/6F10.7)
SD
```

```
1.027 1.113 .386 .420 1.520 3.891 3.943 1.217 4.129 4.080 2.260 4.602 8.607
4.279
LA
'EDU' 'AGE' 'RESID' 'ETHN' 'INCOM' 'DOG' 'ESTEEM' 'VALUE' 'MDTY'
'MEDIA' 'EFFY' 'NORM' 'THRT' 'TOL'
SE
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5
MODEL BE=IN PS=IN LX=IN LY=IN GA=IN PH=IN TD=IN TE=IN
OU SS SE TV EF RS MI TM=300
GROUP 3: COUNTY GOVERNMENT
DA NO=228 MA=CM
CM FU UN=11 FO
(8F10.7/6F10.7)
SD
.916 1.135 .377 .365 1.442 3.675 3.587 1.240 4.351 3.916 2.272 4.708 8.209 5.243
LA
'EDU' 'AGE' 'RESID' 'ETHN' 'INCOM' 'DOG' 'ESTEEM' 'VALUE' 'MDTY'
'MEDIA' 'EFFY' 'NORM' 'THRT' 'TOL'
SE
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5
MODEL BE=IN PS=IN LX=IN LY=IN GA=IN PH=IN TD=IN TE=IN
OU SS SE TV EF RS MI TM=300
END USER
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LISREL input for Model H

```
GROUP 1: THE EXECUTIVE YUAN
DA NG=3 NI=14 NO=306 MA=CM
CM FU UN=9 FO
(8F10.7/6F10.7)
SD
.800 .861 .357 .494 1.758 3.626 3.864 1.250 3.675 4.432 2.393 5.102 6.676 5.062
LA
'EDU' 'AGE' 'RESID' 'ETHN' 'INCOM' 'DOG' 'ESTEEM' 'VALUE' 'MDTY'
'MEDIA' 'EFFY' 'NORM' 'THRT' 'TOL'
SE
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5
MO NX=5 NK=5 NY=9 NE=9 LX=SY,FI LY=SY,FI BE=SD PS=DI TD=ZE TE=FI
FIX    BE (3 2) BE (4 2)-BE (5 1) BE (6 3) BE (7 2) BE (7 3) BE (7 6) BE (8 1)  C
       BE (8 3)-BE (8 5) BE (8 7) BE (9 2) BE (9 3) BE (9 5)-BE (9 7)
FIX    GA (1 4) GA (2 1)-GA (2 4) GA (3 1)-GA(3 5) GA (4 3) GA (4 4)            C
       GA (5 1) GA (5 3) GA (5 4) GA (6 1)-GA (6 3) GA (7 1)-GA (7 3)           C
       GA (7 5) GA (8 1)-GA (8 3) GA (9 1)-GA (9 3) GA (9 5)
```

```
FIX    PH (4 1) PH (5 4)
ST 1.0 LX (1 1) LX (2 2) LX (3 3) LX (4 4) LX (5 5)
ST .8427 LY (1 1)
ST .8266 LY (2 2)
ST 1.0 LY (3 3)
ST .8013 LY (4 4)
ST .7956 LY (5 5)
ST .7411 LY (6 6)
ST .8155 LY (7 7)
ST .9663 LY (8 8)
ST .9280 LY (9 9)
ST .2898 TE (1 1)
ST .3167 TE (2 2)
ST .0000 TE (3 3)
ST .3579 TE (4 4)
ST .3670 TE (5 5)
ST .4508 TE (6 6)
ST .3349 TE (7 7)
ST .0662 TE (8 8)
ST .1338 TE (9 9)
OU SS SE TV EF RS MI TM=300
GROUP 2: THE TAIWAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
DA NO=294 MA=CM
CM FU UN=8 FO
(8F10.7/6F10.7)
SD
1.027 1.113 .386 .420 1.520 3.891 3.943 1.217 4.129 4.080 2.260 4.602 8.607
4.279
LA
'EDU' 'AGE' 'RESID' 'ETHN' 'INCOM' 'DOG' 'ESTEEM' 'VALUE' 'MDTY'
'MEDIA' 'EFFY' 'NORM' 'THRT' 'TOL'
SE
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5
MODEL BE=PS PS=PS LX=PS LY=PS GA=PS PH=PS TD=PS TE=PS
OU SS SE TV EF RS MI TM=300
GROUP 3: COUNTY GOVERNMENT
DA NO=228 MA=CM
CM FU UN=11 FO
(8F10.7/6F10.7)
SD
.916 1.135 .377 .365 1.442 3.675 3.587 1.240 4.351 3.916 2.272 4.708 8.209 5.243
LA
'EDU' 'AGE' 'RESID' 'ETHN' 'INCOM' 'DOG' 'ESTEEM' 'VALUE' 'MDTY'
'MEDIA' 'EFFY' 'NORM' 'THRT' 'TOL'
SE
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5
MODEL BE=PS PS=PS LX=PS LY=PS GA=PS PH=PS TD=PS TE=PS
OU SS SE TV EF RS MI TM=300
END USER
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